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ARTICLES
FROM STOCKHOLM TO KYOTO AND BACK TO THE
UNITED STATES: INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW'S EFFECT ON DOMESTIC LAW
Joel B. Eisen*
We Americans think we're so darned smart. We invented
modern environmental law, developed its sophisticated "com-
mand-and-control" structure,' got the public involved as never
before in fighting corporate polluters,2 and achieved measurable
successes by getting lead out of our air3 and bald eagles back
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tute of Technology; J.D., Stanford Law School. I thank the family and friends of
George E. Allen for making this intellectual journey a rich and rewarding one. Much
credit is due to my Allen Chair colleagues-Professor Ben Boer, Professor Edith
Brown Weiss, Professor Beatriz Bugeda, and Professor Philippe Sands-for their ener-
getic involvement with the Allen family and the law school community, and for their
lively and creative demonstrations of the richness and vitality of international envi-
ronmental law. I also thank the University of Richmond School of Law for its gener-
ous financial support of my research, and John Dernbach and my colleagues, Michael
Allan Wolf and W. Wade Berryhill for their invaluable assistance and comments on
earlier drafts of this article. Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my
editor for life, Tamar Schwartz Eisen. The ideas and opinions expressed herein are
my own, and I am responsible for any errors or omissions.
1. The system of "command and control" regulation is so named because its stat-
utes and regulations "impose detailed, legally enforceable limits, conditions, and affir-
mative requirements on industrial operations, generally controlling sources that gener-
ate pollution on an individual basis." Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental
Regulation: The Dangerous Journey From Command To Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 103, 104 (1998).
2. See infra Part H (discussing the importance of public participation in envi-
ronmental law).
3. Levels of lead in the nation's ambient air declined 96% between 1970 and
1987 as a result of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) rules phasing
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from near extinction.4 We've even tried "second generation"
tools such as emissions trading systems' and incentive-based
regulatory flexibility approaches when we discovered our
system's limitations.6 Not that we've got it all figured out,
down the amount of lead allowed in gasoline. See C.E.Q. 20th ANN. REP. 8 (1989).
For a discussion of the EPA's regulations, see Thomas 0. McGarity, Radical Technolo-
gy-Forcing in Environmental Regulation, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 943, 947-52 (1994).
Professor McGarity's description of the complicated fifteen-year history of these regu-
lations is an excellent case study of wrangling among special interest groups, admin-
istrative agencies, and the courts. See id.
4. In 1963, there were only 417 nesting pairs of bald eagles in the nation. In
1994, there were over 4,000, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) downgrad-
ed the bald eagle from "endangered" to "threatened" status. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h)
(1998). The continued recovery of the bald eagle population led the FWS to consider
proposing the removal of the bald eagle from the list altogether. See James
Gerstenzang, Eagle May Fly From Nest of Endangered, L.A. TIMES, May 6, 1998, at
Al; see also Lois J. Schiffer & Ann C. Juliano, Reform of Environmental Regulations:
Three Points, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 175, 175 (1998) (counting recovery of en-
dangered species such as the bald eagle as a success story of environmental regulato-
ry programs).
5. For example, Title IV of the Clean Air Act, added by the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-71q (1994), created the well-known, market-
based system for trading sulfur dioxide allowances. See generally James E. Krier,
Marketable Pollution Allowances, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 449 (1994); Henry E. Mazurek,
Jr., The Future of Clean Air: The Application of Futures Markets to Title IV of the
1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, 13 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 1 (1994).
6. A good example of a flexible approach to an "inflexible" environmental statute
is the "no surprises" policy under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). See 16 U.S.C. §
1531-44 (1994). Section 9 of the ESA proscribes any "taking" of a listed endangered
animal. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1)(B), 1532(19) (1994) (defining "take" broadly as
"harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to at-
tempt to engage in any such conduct"). A private landowner may apply for an "inci-
dental take" permit under section 10(a) of the ESA for a taking "incidental to, and
not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity," in return for
adopting a habitat conservation plan (HCP) designed to protect the species. See 16
U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1994). Under the "no surprises" policy, the landowner receives
a promise that the government will pay for any additional conservation measures re-
quired if unforeseen consequences occur. See No Surprises Policy, 62 Fed. Reg. 29,091
(1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22(b)(5)-(6), 17.32(b)(5)-(6), 222.22(g)-(h)); J.B.
Ruhl, While the Cat's Asleep: The Making of the "New" ESA, 12 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T 187, 188-190 (1998) (describing the "no surprises" policy); Joseph L. Sax, New
Departures For Land And Water: Concluding Perspectives on Ecosystem Management,
24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 883 (1997) (discussing the HCP process and the "no surprises" poli-
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mind you,' but we're inclined to think of ourselves as world
leaders when it comes to environmental protection.
We've created a massive bureaucracy to administer an un-
wieldy system of environmental laws that rivals the tax code
for sheer complexity.' We are busy playing the endgame of
environmental law's first three decades, tallying up our
system's achievements,9 excoriating its inconsistencies and fail-
ures to regulate this pollutant or that activity, ° debating with
each other about its future," and simply working out the bugs
7. Virtually since the creation of the environmental regulatory system, there has
been a lively discussion of its strengths and weaknesses. For an early debate, com-
pare Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985), which criticizes command and control systems, with
Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform
Standards and 'Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (1985),
which criticizes the opponents of command and control regulation.
8. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., A Superfund Trivia Test: A Comment on the
Complexity of the Environmental Laws, 22 ENVTL. L. 417, 420 (1992) (providing a
humorous look at the complex "hydra-headed nature of the modern environmental
laws"). For the direct comparison to tax law, see Jerry L. Anderson, The Environmen-
tal Revolution At Twenty-Five, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 395, 411 (1995) (stating that "[a] few
experiences with environmental law can make the tax code seem like a walk in the
park").
9. See generally Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A Century of Air Pollution Control Law:
What's Worked; What's Failed; What Might Work, 21 ENvrL. L. 1549 (1991) (detailing
achievements and challenges in laws controlling air pollution); William H. Rodgers,
Jr., The Seven Statutory Wonders of U.S. Environmental Law: Origins and Morpholo-
gy, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1009 (1994) (praising section 102 of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA), section 301 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA), and other successful environmental laws).
Of course, some also take on the task of defending these achievements against
those who would roll back environmental laws. See generally Zygmunt J.B. Plater,
Environmental Law as a Mirror of the Future: Civic Values Confronting Market Force
Dynamics in a Time of Counter-Revolution, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 733 (1996)
(describing rollback initiatives in the 104th Congress); Joseph L. Sax, The Second
Annual Lloyd K Garrison Lecture on Environmental Law: Using Property Rights to
Attack Environmental Protection, 14 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1996).
10. See, e.g., Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Population, Consumption and Environment
Law, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 89, 89 (1997) (claiming that environmental laws
"have failed to deal effectively with many problems"). According to Professor Reitze,
"[slignificant wetland and wildlife habitat losses continue; the natural forests in the
United States are disappearing; most urban areas fail to meet one or more air quali-
ty standards; and global warming has not been seriously addressed." Id. He also
advocates action to deal with the "failure to understand the holistic interrelationship
of environmental degradation to population and consumption." Id.; see also Arnold W.
Reitze, Jr., Environmental Policy-It Is Time For A New Beginning, 14 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 111 (1989).
11. See Steinzor, supra note 1 (discussing "reinvention initiatives" such as Project
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in the system." It should come as no surprise that many of us
pay little attention to international environmental law.1 It
isn't that we believe it is unnecessary. We acknowledge a role
for international solutions in curbing transboundary pollution, a
straight-forward extension of the notion that pollution knows no
boundaries. 4 But overwhelmingly, we think of international
XL); see also Robert V. Percival, Responding to Environmental Risk: A Pluralistic
Perspective, 14 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 513, 526 (1997) (discussing reasons for "efforts to
'reinvent regulation"); 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T (1997) (a collection of articles
discussing regulatory reform). Beyond the initiatives designed to achieve regulatory
reform, there are frequent calls to overhaul various statutes or regulatory regimes.
These are so numerous that I will spare the reader the tedium of a list.
Some of the freshest contemporary salvos in the reinvention debate are the
innovative works advocating new organizing principles or frameworks for a next gen-
eration of environmental law. See generally John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Develop-
ment as a Framework for National Governance, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (1998)
(advocating reform of existing laws and institutions based upon principles of sustain-
able development); Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrating Thoughtways: Re-Opening of
the Environmental Mind?, 1989 WIS. L. REv. 463; J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmen-
tal Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the Environment by Mak-
ing a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 Hous. L. REv. 933 (1997) (applying the theory
of complex adaptive systems to environmental law and describing how it might be
revolutionized to comport with this theory).
12. A good example of the gaps, inconsistencies, and other shortcomings of mod-
em environmental regulation is the haphazard regulation of "toxic" and "hazardous"
pollutants under the various pollution control statutes. See John C. Dernbach, The
Unfocused Regulation of Toxic and Hazardous Pollutants, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1
(1997).
Even when we think we have solved a problem, it may nevertheless reemerge.
See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Deception, Self-Deception, and Myth: Evaluating Long-
Term Environmental Settlements, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 567 (1995) (describing problems
with "settling" environmental disputes).
13. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of International Environmental Law
On United States Pollution Control Law, 21 VT. L. REV. 759, 760 (1997) (noting that
"United States environmental law has ... as a whole, ignored the relationship be-
tween domestic and international environmental law, and most lawyers have paid
little attention to the possibility that international law could influence the content of
our law").
14. A frequently asserted justification for domestic environmental law is the curb-
ing of inteijurisdictional spillovers. Among the first to advocate this proposition was
Professor Richard Stewart. See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of
Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86
YALE L.J. 1196, 1226-30 (1977) (stating that federal controls are necessary to prevent
spillover effects); infra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the perception that
the Trial Smelter decision held transboundary pollution unlawful); see also Daniel C.
Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 593, 626-27
(1996); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2342-43 (1996).
After the adoption of Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2
of the Rio Declaration, it is now "widely recognized to reflect customary international
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environmental law as a largely sanctionless creation "full of
sound and fury, signifying nothing,"" the "jurisprudential
equivalent of vaporware." "
I imagine most environmental lawyers have heard of the
Montreal Protocol' or the recent global climate change agree-
ment, 8 though I suspect few could tell you much about how
law" that nations have a responsibility to not cause transboundary pollution. Philippe
Sands, International Environmental Law: An Introductory Overview, in GREENING
INTERNATIONAL LAW xv, xv (P. Sands ed., 1994); see also Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Pre-
sentation by Dr. Malgosia Fitzmaurice, in INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ICJ/UNITAR COLLOQUR TO
CELEBRATE THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE COURT 398, 401 (Connie Peck & R.S. Lee
eds., 1997); Cliona J.M. Kimber, A Comparison of Environmental Federalism in the
United States and the European Union, 54 MD. L. REV. 1658, 1659 (1995) (discussing
the importance of multijurisdictional solutions to international transboundary pollution
problems); Kal Raustiala, The "Participatory Revolution" In International Environmen-
tal Law, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 537, 537 (1997); Mark J. Spaulding, Transparency
of Environmental Regulation and Public Participation in the Resolution of Internation-
al Environmental Disputes, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1127, 1128 (1995) ("Pollution
does not respect national borders. Therefore, we see an increasingly international
emphasis on global commons and cross-border pollution prevention and clean-up."); A.
Dan Tarlock, Exclusive Sovereignty Versus Sustainable Development of a Shared Re-
source: The Dilemma of Latin American Rainforest Management, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J.
37, 44 (1997) ("The environmental case against exclusive national sovereignty [over
resources] rests on the scientific and economic argument that unacceptable levels of
transboundary and global spillovers exist. . . ."). But see Thomas W. Merrill, Golden
Rules For Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 934 (1997) (arguing that regu-
lation of transboundary pollution at the domestic and international level is "underde-
veloped").
15. WILLuI SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, Act V, sc. 5.
16. Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Federalism in a Global Economy, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1283, 1314 (1997). "Vaporware" is the term for the widespread practice in the
computer industry of announcing products not yet (and maybe never) ready for the
marketplace. See Robert Prentice, Vaporware: Imaginary High-Tech Products and Real
Antitrust Liability in a Post-Chicago World, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1163, 1163 n.2 (1996).
17. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,
1987, S. TREATY DOC. No. 10, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), 26 I.L.M. 1541, 1550
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]; see also Dale S.
Bryk, The Montreal Protocol and Recent Developments to Protect the Ozone Layer, 15
HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 275 (1991). The Montreal Protocol, "perhaps the most widely
cited and analyzed [international] environmental agreement," is probably the most
familiar agreement to domestic lawyers. See Raustiala, supra note 14, at 543.
18. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]; see also Charlotte
Booncharoen & John Gase, International Commitment Toward Curbing Global Warm-
ing: The Kyoto Protocol, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 917 (1998); William K. Stevens, Meeting
Reaches Accord to Reduce Greenhouse Gases, N.Y. TIES, Dec. 11, 1997, at Al (dis-
cussing provisions of the Kyoto Protocol and predicting difficulty in ratification by the
U.S. Senate).
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they work. Beyond that, knowledge about international environ-
mental law is probably thin. Consider this series of lawyerly
followup questions about any treaty:19 What substantive and
procedural obligations does it impose on signatories such as the
United States? Is there a regulatory agency comparable to the
EPA that supervises the agreement? Do we do what we're sup-
posed to do under the agreement?" If not, who (if anyone) can
do something about it? How successful has the agreement been
in achieving its goals?2
I doubt most environmental lawyers could answer these ques-
tions; a year ago, I would not have put my knowledge of inter-
national environmental law to this test. Like others, I tended to
think this body of law was rather ineffectual and wholly sepa-
rate from domestic environmental law.22 I confess to having
been mistaken. The recent and rapid developments in interna-
tional environmental law can influence our domestic system of
environmental law. We should abandon any conceptual sepa-
ration of the two bodies of law, and instead think of the two as
having evolved into a new relationship in which international
environmental law can and does play a role in the development
and refinement of domestic law.2
International environmental law is maturing into a remark-
ably sophisticated body of law that is increasingly becoming
19. In posing this question, of course, I have left aside the role that customary
international law plays in safeguarding the environment. See Sands, supra note 14, at
xxii ("The primary role of treaties and acts of international organizations should not
obscure the important-albeit secondary-role played by customary international
law.").
20. Professor Edith Brown Weiss terms this an inquiry regarding "compliance,"
distinguishing this question from questions of implementation and effectiveness of
international environmental agreements. See infra notes 201-09 and accompanying
text.
21. To Professor Brown Weiss, this is a question of the agreement's "effective-
ness." See infra Part II.C.1.b.
22. As Professor Brown Weiss observes, I was certainly not alone; there is a long
tradition of drawing "a sharp line between international and domestic law," but that
divide is "fading." Edith Brown Weiss, Understanding Compliance With International
Environmental Agreements: The Baker's Dozen Myths, 32 U. RICH. L. REv. 1555, 1557-
58 (1999).
23. I am indebted to Professor Ben Boer for making this observation in his public
lecture in the Allen Chair Visiting Scholars series, and to each of the Allen Profes-
sors for prompting me to explore the connection between the two systems of law. See
infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
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intertwined with domestic law. I discuss this relationship in
this article, building upon lessons learned from the distin-
guished visiting scholars of the George E. Allen Chair in Law
at the University of Richmond School of Law for the Spring
1998 semester 4 through their interaction with faculty, stu-
dents of the Allen Chair Symposium and seminar series, and
the law school community. Through the keen insights of these
scholars, the reader will come to see the vital and dynamic
nature of the connection between domestic and international
environmental law.
Like all associations between two complex systems, this is a
multifaceted relationship. International environmental law's
influence on the content of domestic law is perhaps the way in
which the two systems are most obviously symbiotic." The
conjunction of the two occurs in a complex process. Internation-
al environmental agreements often assume a linear cause-and-
effect relationship with domestic law: the agreement calls for
domestic law to be enacted to implement its provisions or con-
form to its norms. I caution the reader that the relationship is
not so linear as it appears, and is indeed much messier. The
interweaving between the two systems is a sort of discursive
24. The George E. Allen Chair in Law was endowed by the family and friends of
George E. Allen to honor this distinguished Virginia trial lawyer and founder of the
highly regarded civil litigation firm of Allen, Allen, Allen & Allen, based in Rich-
mond, Virginia. The Spring 1998 semester marked the ninth year that the faculty of
the University of Richmond School of Law had the opportunity to invite eminent
figures in law and related fields to visit the law school and participate in a sympo-
sium and advanced seminar.
In 1998, the title for the symposium and course was "Resolving International
Environmental Disputes in the 1990s and Beyond." The group of four visiting scholars
and holders of the Allen Chair-Professor Beatriz Bugeda of Universidad
Iberoamericana, Mexico City, Mexico; Professor Ben Boer, University of Sydney, Aus-
tralia; Professor Edith Brown Weiss, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington,
D.C.; and Professor Philippe Sands, Reader in International Law, University of Lon-
don and Professor, Global Law Faculty, New York University Law School-was well-
suited to explore the future of international environmental law. Each professor is
highly qualified and well regarded, and each has extensive scholarship and practice
experience in the field of international environmental law. The professors were truly
an international contingent, hailing from Australia, Great Britain, Mexico, and the
United States. Each professor visited the law school for approximately one week,
during which the professor taught two seminar classes, gave a public presentation to
the university community, engaged in a faculty colloquy, and took part in other activ-
ities related to the course theme.
25. By this, I do not mean to imply that the two systems are locked in a depen-
dent affiliation, but merely to suggest that there is a close relationship.
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interlocution with inadequately understood feedback mecha-
nisms and cause-and-effect linkages.
Comparing the two legal regimes, one often does not observe
a direct cause-and-effect link between an international environ-
mental agreement or principle and its domestic counterpart, but
instead sees frequent false starts and opportunities missed or
as yet unexplored. In his article, Professor Ben Boer demon-
strates how principles developed at the world stage (in this
case, "sustainable development") can serve as a source of do-
mestic law. The complexity involved in translating that princi-
ple into domestic law is evidenced in Professor Boer's observa-
tion that, at present, the implementation of sustainable devel-
opment principles in the Asian region shows "little consisten-
cy."26 That principles initially developed on the international
stage can lead to domestic innovation, but only with assiduous
attention to their implementation, is also apparent in the tepid
American response to fulfill the international agenda for sus-
tainable development.27
Beyond influencing the content of domestic law, international
environmental law can often have enormous impact precisely
because it is an evolving regime grappling with many problems
comparable to those first addressed decades ago in the domestic
setting. This asynchronous evolution of the international envi-
ronmental legal regime often takes us down the road not tak-
en," yielding solutions different from and in some cases com-
plementary to those available under domestic environmental
laws. International environmental law can also play a hortatory
role inspiring us to strengthen cherished principles in domestic
law. Both of these roles are in evidence in Professor Beatriz
Bugeda's analysis of the Cozumel Submission brought under the
Citizen's Submission process of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) environmental side agreement.29 While
26. Ben Boer, The Rise of Environmental Law in the Asian Region, 32 U. RICH.
L. REV. 1503, 1545 (1999).
27. See infra Part II.
28. See Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken, in COLLECTED POEMS, PROSE, &
PLAYS 103 (Richard Polrer & Mark Richardson eds., 1995).
29. See Beatriz Bugeda, Is NAFTA up to Its Green Expectations? Effective Law
Enforcement under the North American Agreement on Environmental Consideration, 32
U. RICH. L. REV. 1591, 1605-13 (1999).
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criticizing its many flaws and making suggestions for improve-
ment, Professor Bugeda finds that this process creates an inter-
national forum for public input in domestic development pro-
jects. Just as importantly though, her analysis reinforces the
legitimacy of public participation in domestic fora.
The experience that actors gain in the evolution of interna-
tional environmental law provides valuable lessons for the do-
mestic setting. Scholars who sift methodically through this
experiential evidence, analyzing its trends and offering recom-
mendations for change, develop insights useful for thinking
about complex problems in the domestic system. Professor Edith
Brown Weiss's article, based on a groundbreaking international
study of compliance by eight nations with five international
environmental agreements, debunks a "Baker's Dozen" of thir-
teen myths about how and why nations comply with these and
other international agreements." Her analysis provides useful
principles that help explain why all actors give effect to inter-
national law, and affords tremendous insights about how do-
mestic laws should be structured to effectuate compliance. Pro-
fessor Philippe Sands focuses on international environmental
litigation and the tension it generates between nations and the
international community. His article offers insights applicable
not only in an analysis of the proper role of international tribu-
nals, but also in the ongoing discussion of national sovereignty,
and, by analogy, in the debate over environmental federalism in
the United States."'
In Part I, I begin my discussion of the relationship between
the two legal regimes with a brief introduction to modern inter-
national environmental law to assist those whose knowledge is
as limited as mine was not too long ago. I also describe how
the Allen Chair Symposium and seminar series was designed to
facilitate exploration of major trends in international environ-
30. See generally Brown Weiss, supra note 22. For a detailed description of the
study of compliance, which Professor Brown Weiss conducted with political scientist
Harold K. Jacobson and a team of international collaborators, see Edith Brown Weiss,
The Five International Treaties: A Living History, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTH-
ENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCoRDs (Edith Brown
Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds. 1998) [hereinafter ENGAGING COUNTRIES].
31. See generally Philippe Sands, International Environmental Litigation and Its
Future, 32 U. RICH. L. REv. 1619 (1999).
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mental law. Part II provides a more in-depth look at the specif-
ic relationship between domestic and international environmen-
tal law. I conclude that international environmental law in-
forms domestic law as a wellspring of law leading to domestic
innovation, a complement to domestic law, a source of hortatory
experience, and a laboratory for experiential insights. From
time to time, I refer to the specific challenges of domestic
"brownfields" laws and policies, a subject which I have ad-
dressed in detail elsewhere.
I. RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES IN THE
1990S AND BEYOND: RECENT TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The integrating theme for the Spring 1998 Allen Chair series
was Resolving International Environmental Disputes in the
1990s And Beyond. Twenty-five years ago, the notion of a semi-
nar-long scholarly series devoted to international environmental
law would have been curious at best and probably laughable at
worst. Even the most ardent supporters of international envi-
ronmental law would have concluded, to quote Gertrude Stein,
that "there is no there there."32 The situation is very different
today, following a quarter century of rapid development and
evolution of the law.
A. From Stockholm to Kyoto: International Environmental Law
Grows and Matures
Most observers believe the modern era in international envi-
ronmental law began at the 1972 Stockholm Conference.33 As
in the domestic setting, however, there is a longer history of
legal activity aimed at protecting the international environment.
Professor Sands traces the genesis of international environmen-
tal law to the turn of the twentieth century.34 He notes that
an international arbitral tribunal decision in 1893, which al-
lowed British exploration of fur seals on the high seas, but
32. GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (1937).
33. See United Nations Conference on the Human Environment at Stockholm,
June 5-16, 1972 [hereinafter Stockholm Conference].
34. See Sands, supra note 31, at 1619-21.
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prescribed regulations to protect the seals, "marked the begin-
ning of international environmental law."5 In the twentieth
century, a number of developments predate the Stockholm Con-
ference: the bilateral and multilateral international environmen-
tal agreements dating to the early 1900s on subjects such as
protecting wildlife,36 the well-known Trail Smelter decision of
1941,"7 the 1949 UNSCCUR conference (which "sowed the
seeds for the development of legislation to address international
environmental issues")," and agreements negotiated in the
1950s and 1960s after UNSCCUR to address marine pollution
and other topics. 9 However, one could best describe interna-
tional environmental law in this period as developing
"incrementally."40
The Stockholm Conference "placed global environmental is-
sues firmly on the international government agenda for the first
time."4' Conference delegates adopted a declaration of environ-
mental principles, the "Stockholm Declaration."42 This non-
binding statement featured twenty-six general principles, two of
which, regarding states' responsibility not to cause
transboundary harms within the context of national sovereign-
ty,' serve as bedrock statements of international environmen-
35. Id. at 1621; see also Sands, supra note 14, at xv.
36. One example of such an agreement was the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling. Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Sept. 24, 1931, 49
Stat. 3079, 155 L.N.T.S. 359; see also Edith Brown Weiss, International Environmen-
tal Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order, 81 GEo. L.J.
675, 676 (1993).
37. Philippe Sands notes that the Trail Smelter case, Trail Smelter Arbitration
(U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1907 (1935), which predates the development of virtually all
modern international environmental law, is frequently-and mistakenly-cited for the
proposition that transboundary pollution is unlawful under international law. See
Sands, supra note 31, at 1621-22; cf Brown Weiss, supra note 36, at 676-77.
38. Sands, supra note 31, at 1622.
39. See id. at 1623-24; Brown Weiss, supra note 36, at 677-78.
40. Sands, supra note 31, at 1623.
41. Ben Boer, Institutionalizing Ecologically Sustainable Development: The Roles of
National, State, and Local Governments in Translating Grand Strategy Into Action, 31
WILLAMETE L. REV. 307, 307 (1995).
42. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 and Corr. 1, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416
(1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
43. Principle 2 provides: "The natural resources of the earth, including the air,
water, land, flora and fauna and especially representative samples of natural ecosys-
tems, must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations through
careful planning or management, as appropriate." Id. at princ. 2. Principle 21 con-
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tal law.' The Stockholm Declaration, taken together with an
action plan embodying recommendations for specific actions,
"represented the international community's first effort at con-
structing a coherent strategy for the development of interna-
tional policy, law, and institutions to protect the environ-
ment."45
While rapid developments were well underway even as the
Stockholm Conference took place,46 most observers believe that
Stockholm catalyzed the growth of international environmental
law." It can now be claimed that there is "a solid body of
rules of international environmental law."' Sources of this law
include bilateral, regional, and multilateral treaties, "secondary
legislation" (binding and non-binding acts of international orga-
nizations),49 customary rules of international law, and non-
binding documents such as the Stockholm Declaration.0 Inter-
national environmental law incorporates broadly applicable
norms such as the "precautionary principle," calling for environ-
mental protective measures in the absence of full scientific
certainty regarding threats of harm,5' and "intergenerational
strains this by recognizing "the sovereign right of nations to exploit their own re-
sources." Id. at princ. 21. See generally Louis B. Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on
the Human Environment, 14 HARv. INT'L L.J. 423 (1973).
44. See Sands, supra note 14, at xxxi.
45. See id.
46. "Many important legal developments took place in the period surrounding the
[Stockholm] Conference, including negotiation of the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species, the London Ocean Dumping Convention, the World
Heritage Convention, and the first of the UNEP regional seas conventions." Brown
Weiss, supra note 35, at 678.
47. See, e.g., Sands, supra note 14, at xxvii.
48. Id. at xxviii; see also Brown Weiss, supra note 36 at 679. See generally
Sands, supra note 14, at xxxv-xxxviii (discussing the role of standards in modern
international environmental law).
49. Non-binding instruments are popularly known as "soft law." See generally Pi-
•erre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 420 (1991).
50. See generally Sands, supra note 14, at xxii-xxiii (discussing sources of modern
international environmental law).
51. This concept is enshrined in the Rio Declaration. See United Nations Confer-
ence on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
ment June 14, 1992, UNCED Doc. AJCONF.151Rev. 1, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874,
879 [hereinafter Rio Declaration]; see also Boer, supra note 41, at 313. But see Frank
B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
851, 852 (1996) (describing the prominence of the precautionary principle in interna-
tional and domestic environmental law, but criticizing it as "deeply perverse in its
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equity," recognizing that the needs of both present and future
generations must be taken into account in environmental policy-
making.
52
There are now about 1000 bilateral, regional, and multilater-
al documents that contain provisions aimed at safeguarding
natural resources or curbing pollution,53 many of which have
been adopted since Stockholm. Multiple agreements are being
developed at any given time, making it difficult for nations
simply to keep up with the negotiations.' As Professor Brown
Weiss has noted, the coverage and scope of these agreements
differs significantly from those of the past:
The subject matter of international environmental agree-
ments now bears little resemblance to that in agreements
concluded in the first half of this century, which focused on
boundary rivers, fishing rights, and protection of particular-
ly valued animal species. Today there are agreements to
control pollution in all environmental media, conserve hab-
itats, protect global commons, such as the high-level ozone
layer, and protect resources located within countries that
are of concern to the international community...
The scope of international agreements has expanded signifi-
cantly since 1972: from transboundary pollution agreements
to global pollution agreements; from control of direct emis-
sions into lakes to comprehensive river basin system re-
gimes; from preservation of certain species to conservation
of ecosystems; from agreements that take effect only at na-
tional borders to ones that restrain resource use and control
implications for the environment and human welfare").
52. See Rio Declaration, supra note 51, princ. 3 (stating that "the right to devel-
opment must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental
needs of present and future generations"). Professor Brown Weiss, whose ground-
breaking book on intergenerational equity, EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO
FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMiON PATRIMONY, AND
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUIY (1989), maintains that present generations have a respon-
sibility to future generations to protect the environment and notes that "sustainable
development is inherently intergenerational." Brown Weiss, supra note 36, at 707. See
generally Edith Brown Weiss, Sustainable Development Symposium, A Reply to
Barresi's 'Beyond Fairness to Future Generations," 11 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 89 (1997);
Edith Brown Weiss, Environmentally Sustainable Competitiveness: A Comment, 102
YALE L.J. 2123 (1993).
53. See Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1555.
54. See Brown Weiss, supra note 36, at 679; Sands, supra note 14, at x.
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activities within national borders, such as for world heritag-
es, wetlands, and biologically diverse areas."5
International agreements increasingly embody sophisticated
regulatory techniques, including specific obligations to reduce
pollution or conserve resources that impose responsibilities on
nations beyond those found in domestic environmental law.
Under the Kyoto Protocol, for example, the United States would
have to reduce its emissions of specified gases thought to con-
tribute to global warming by 7% from 1990 levels in the 2008-
2012 timeframe.5 Another example of increasing complexity is
the recognition of the relationship between trade and the envi-
ronment, long ignored, in the context of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA).7 The breadth and depth of international
environmental law was in evidence twenty years after Stock-
holm, when the international community gathered for the Unit-
ed Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED or Rio Conference), in Rio de Janeiro. The Convention
on the Conservation of Biological Diversity and Framework
Convention on Climate Change were opened for signature, and
the delegates approved the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development58 and the far-reaching Agenda 21."
Put all these agreements, standards, principles, prescriptions
and legal techniques together, and a fairly consistent picture
emerges. Once "marginal," environmental issues have become "a
central concern of the UN, GATT and other international insti-
tutions, and to all governments."" As one observer notes, the
proliferation of international environmental law means that "we
55. Brown Weiss, supra note 36, at 679-81; see id. at 680-81 (listing international
and regional agreements negotiated between 1985 and 1992).
56. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 18, at art. 3 (imposing obligation on countries
listed in Annex I) and Annex I (listing the United States with a 7% reduction tar-
get).
57. See Sands, supra note 14, at xli; see generally John H. Jackson, World Trade
Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1227 (1992). The body of literature on NAFTA and GATT is expanding rapidly. See
infra note 102 and accompanying text (listing articles discussing the dispute resolu-
tion process under NAFTA's environmental side agreement).
58. See Rio Declaration, supra note 51.
59. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda Item 21,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/PC/100/Add.1 (1992) [hereinafter Agenda 211.
60. Sands, supra note 14, at xxx.
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may be in the early stages of the development of a genuine
regime of international environmental protection."6 Still, inter-
national environmental law is not yet as sophisticated as that
of the United States or Europe. It is a "fledgling," growing and
maturing but still in its formative stages.62 In its path of de-
velopment stands a host of challenges. With power dispersed
among secretariats and other bodies, there is no coordinated
home for international environmental regulatory authority."
Mechanisms for non-governmental organizations (NGOs)6 or
private citizens to participate in international environmental
decision making are currently limited. There are problems with
implementation of and compliance with international environ-
mental agreements. At present, nations rarely resort to official
dispute resolution fora to address international environmental
conflicts, and when they do, the results are not encouraging.
As Professor Sands has noted, there is lingering doubt about
international environmental law's future:
Despite impressive achievements, there is reason to doubt
that this body of law will have significant impact on actual
governmental and human [behavior]. Limited implementa-
tion and enforcement suggests that international environ-
mental law remains in its formative stages. Law-making is
61. Farber, supra note 16, at 1316. As Professor Brown Weiss observes, some
scholars would disagree, particularly "those in the Realist School [who] question the
relevance of international law at all." Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1559-60 (foot-
note omitted).
62. See Brown Weiss, supra note 36, at 707; Sands, supra note 14, at xxx; see
also Sanford E. Gaines, Global and Regional Perspectives on International Environ-
mental Protection, 19 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 983, 983-84 (1997).
In spite of its roots in the early years of the twentieth century, interna-
tional environmental law is still immature. Its rapid but helter-skelter
growth in recent years marks a movement still in its adolescent phase,
with all the energy, tension, hope, and fear of that time of life, and all
its vulnerability to outside influences.
Id.
63. See Sands, supra note 14, at x.
64. For the purposes of this article, NGOs are "private organizations that are
directly engaged in influencing international environmental law." Raustiala, supra
note 14, at 541; see generally A. Dan Tarlock, The Role of Non-Governmental Organi-
zations in the Development of International Environmental Law, 68 Cm.-KENT L. REv.
61 (1992). NGOs are comparable to public interest groups in domestic environmental
law. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and Interna-
tional Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183, 186-87 (1997) (noting that the definition
of an NGO is rather fluid).
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decentralized, with legislative initiatives being developed in
literally dozens of different intergovernmental organizations
at the global, regional, and sub-regional level. Coordination
among the initiatives is inadequate, leading to measures
which are often duplicative and sometimes inconsistent.
Moreover, the law-making process tends to be reactive and
ad hoc in nature, often vulnerable to the vagaries of politi-
cal, economic, and scientific events and findings.65
B. Allen Chair Professors Assess International Environmental
Law's Progress
Professor Sands's appraisal, while accurate today, might have
a short shelf life. As is the case domestically, developments in
international environmental law now occur rapidly. Delegates in
Japan adopted the Kyoto Protocol less than one month before
the Law School's Spring 1998 semester began. The NAFTA
machinery is less than five years old; until the end of 1997, no
case had proceeded to the conclusion of the Citizen's Submis-
sion process under its environmental side agreement. Professor
Brown Weiss has identified specific changes taking place in this
body of law. Nations negotiate and conclude international envi-
ronmental agreements more quickly: "[i]t is now rare for coun-
tries to need more than two years to negotiate even complicat-
ed, detailed international agreements."66 Negotiators create
mechanisms to promote flexibility in responding to improved
scientific understanding, and have directed their attention in-
creasingly to protecting ecosystems rather than protecting
against individual harms.6" There is increased attention to the
impact of treaties on nonparties, and broadening of public input
in the development and enforcement of international environ-
mental agreements.6" With the emergence of increasingly de-
tailed agreements,69 parties are fashioning creative methods of
ensuring implementation and compliance.
65. Sands, supra note 14, at xxx.
66. Brown Weiss, supra note 36, at 685-86.
67. See id. at 688-91.
68. See id. at 691-94.
69. See id. at 696.
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As Professor Sands observed, international environmental law
has "grown from a body of national and bilateral rules into an
area increasingly governed by regional and global obligations,
including enforceable standards."" The Allen Chair seminar
series considered some of this development's far-reaching impli-
cations. Rather than focus exclusively on one treaty or environ-
mental medium, the seminar series was designed as a cross-
cutting examination of major trends in the evolution of interna-
tional environmental law, including those to which I now turn.
1. Implementing Agreements Requires More Effort and
Attention
Implementing international environmental agreements or
non-binding "soft law"-taking steps necessary to make docu-
ments effective at the national level 1 -is an increasingly com-
plicated proposition as legal texts become more detailed and
prescriptive. 2 International environmental agreements are
rarely self-executing. An agreement or "soft law" document can
require nations to adopt implementing legislation or regula-
tions; 3 the Kyoto Protocol, for example, would force the United
States to develop energy conservation strategies and other emis-
sions-reducing measures. '4 Other necessary implementation
steps could include such measures as the designation of an
appropriate liaison to international bodies. 5 It has become
quite clear that nations do not automatically take all of these
steps. For example, the Basel Convention on controlling inter-
national traffic in hazardous waste was never ratified in the
70. Sands, supra note 14, at xv.
71. Professor Sands defines implementation as, "[wihat formal or informal steps
must a State or international institution take to implement its international legal
obligations." Philippe Sands, Enforcing Environmental Security, in GREENING INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 50, 52 (Philippe Sands ed., 1994); see infra Part Iu.C.l.a. (discussing
Professor Brown Weiss's analysis of "implementation" as differentiated from "compli-
ance").
72. An excellent case study of the challenges inherent in implementing complex
agreements is Edith Brown Weiss, New Directions for the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement: A Commentary, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 375 (1989).
73. See Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1562; Sands, supra note 71, at 53.
74. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 18, at art. 2.
75. See, e.g., Sands, supra note 71, at 53.
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United States because it would have required Congress to pass
changes to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.7"
Professor Boer has focused much of his contemporary work
on the implementation of sustainable development principles
(emanating from Agenda 21 and documents preceding it) in the
Asian region. He co-authored a recent book, International Envi-
ronmental Law in the Asia Pacific,77 that collects numerous
case studies on implementing international environmental law
in the region, some of which he shared with the seminar course
students and the law school community. With his indefatigable
spirit, years of expertise and comprehensive knowledge of the
problems facing individual countries in the Asian region, such
as India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, China, and
island nations of the Pacific, he has been a leader in calling for
innovative national environmental laws and regional coopera-
tion frameworks to promote sustainable development.7"
2. There Is an Increased Focus on Compliance
It is one thing to marshal the political will to negotiate an
international environmental agreement, still another to imple-
ment it, and yet another altogether to secure compliance with
its provisions. Paradoxically, while recent agreements incorpo-
rate a wide variety of mechanisms designed to secure compli-
ance,79 little is actually known about whether they succeed. As
Professor Brown Weiss observes, compliance "has long been
neglected as an important issue in international law"; the "con-
ventional wisdom" about compliance is that nations comply with
international agreements because it is in their self-interest to
76. See Tarlock, supra note 13, at 763; Mark Bradford, Note, The United States,
China & the Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
And Their Disposal, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 305 (1997). For a contemporary discus-
sion of the implementation of the Basel Convention elsewhere, see Philippe Sands,
Book Review and Note, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 572 (1997) (reviewing KATHARINA KUMMER,
INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF HAZARDOUS WASTES: THE BASEL CONVENTION AND
RELATED LEGAL RULES (1995)).
77. See BEN BOER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE ASIA PA-
CIFIC (1998).
78. See generally Boer, supra note 26.
79. See generally ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 30; Brown Weiss, supra note
22; cf. Tarlock, supra note 13, at 763 (noting that international environmental agree-
ments embody innovative compliance mechanisms).
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do so.8" Now, however, that fiction is crumbling and compli-
ance issues are attracting increased attention from commenta-
tors, many of whom follow Professor Brown Weiss's lead. 1
Professor Brown Weiss's empirical study of eight nations and
five environmental agreements, a team effort with political
scientist Dr. Harold Jacobson and a group of researchers oper-
ating in nations around the world, is a landmark effort address-
ing compliance issues. It examines how and why it is that in-
ternational environmental agreements secure compliance with
their provisions." Not surprisingly, this study has garnered
substantial praise for its broad scope and creation of a valuable
knowledge base on compliance issues. According to one admirer,
the Brown Weiss-Jacobson study on compliance has the ex-
tremely useful function of moving the debate over compliance
from "ivory tower description" to a comprehensive and wide-
ranging discussion of the ways in which actual agreements suc-
ceed. 3 As a further movement in this direction, Professor
80. Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1556, 1559. Besides the assumption that
nations comply, Professor Brown Weiss lists other reasons why scant attention has
been paid to compliance:
In international environmental law, this occurs in part because political
capital comes from negotiating new agreements, not from complying with
those agreements already negotiated. This also occurs for other reasons:
it is often hard to measure compliance; effectiveness of the agreement
does not necessarily correlate with compliance of the agreement; and
resources to promote compliance have often been minimal.
Id. at 1556 (footnotes omitted). For additional discussion by Professor Brown Weiss of
this and other issues related to compliance, see Edith Brown Weiss, Strengthening
National Compliance with International Environmental Agreements, 27 ENvTL. POLy
& L. 297 (1997) [hereinafter Brown Weiss, Strengthening National Compliance].
81. The 1997 annual meeting of the American Society of International Law (ASIL)
and a recent symposium sponsored by the Michigan Journal of International Law
focused on compliance issues, "a topic that has seized the attention of researchers
within international law." Jose E. Alvarez, Why Nations Behave, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L.
303, 303 (1998). Both meetings reflected the considerable influence of Professor Brown
Weiss's work on compliance: for example, the title of the Michigan symposium incor-
porated her "implementation, compliance and effectiveness" framework for evaluating
compliance. See id. at 303; see also infra notes 201-07 and accompanying text. Other
scholars have been quick to adapt Professor Brown Weiss's definitions of relevant
terms. See, e.g., Jo Elizabeth Butler, The Establishment of a Dispute Resolution/Non-
Compliance Mechanism in the Climate Change Convention, in Maria Gavouneli, Com-
pliance with International Environmental Treaties: The Empirical Evidence, 91 AM.
Soc'y INT'L L. PRoc. 234, 252 (1997) (referring to Professor Brown Weiss's definition
of "implementation").
82. See generally ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 30.
83. See Alvarez, supra note 81, at 305.
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Brown Weiss's Allen Chair article uses the study results to pick
apart conventional wisdom about compliance by undercutting
thirteen familiar assumptions, all of which, she avers, "turn out
either to be myths or to apply only in certain carefully pre-
scribed conditions."'
As international environmental law matures, the compliance
discussion led by Professor Brown Weiss and Dr. Jacobson
serves another valuable purpose. It calls into question the Real-
ist School's doubts "whether international . . . law can be even
considered 'law' without a unified supranational government, or
should merely be considered 'evanescent moments of interna-
tional cooperation.'"" Some would still argue that international
environmental law amounts to little in the absence of a central
sovereign." To Professor Brown Weiss, this view is grounded
in a traditional view of the structure of the international law
system, one that, as she demonstrates in her article, is chang-
ing rapidly:
The myths [about compliance] are set in an international
legal system that is in a process of transition from a state-
centered, hierarchical and static structure to one that con-
sists of networks of actors and is non-hierarchical and dy-
namic. Moreover, the framework for compliance has changed
from one that is hierarchical and "top down" to one that
involves dynamic interactions between states and non-state
actors and international and domestic constituencies across
state lines.87
In this emerging international law system, it is simply not the
case that "states do not comply at all with their international
obligations;"' the reality is much more complicated. Thus, ac-
84. Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1560.
85. Kyle Danish, The New Sovereignty: Compliance With International Regulatory
Agreements, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 789, 804 (1997) (book review); see also Harold H. Koh,
Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L. J. 2599, 2608-17 (1997) (dis-
cussing whether international law is truly "law"); supra note 61 (discussing the Real-
ist School position).
86. See, e.g., Alberto Szekely, Compliance With Environmental Treaties: The Em-
pirical Evidence, A Commentary on the Softening of International Environmental Law,
in Compliance with International Environmental Treaties: The Empirical Evidence,
supra note 81, at 234.
87. Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1557.
88. Id. at 1561.
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cording to one admirer, by debunking the conventional wisdom
about compliance Professor Brown Weiss also advances the
debate about international environmental law "beyond well-
worn debates about whether international law is truly 'law' to
. . . 'post-ontological' inquiries appropriate to the new maturity
of the international system."89
3. The Status of National Sovereignty Remains in Flux
International environmental law is creating more constraints,
not fewer, on nations' abilities to act independently." Detailed
international agreements embodying specific obligations neces-
sarily encroach on national sovereignty. The dynamism in this
relationship can be seen by examining the increasing impor-
tance of international tribunals in environmental cases, which
necessarily invites a discussion of the relationship between
international and national courts. Professor Sands's article as-
sesses the future of international environmental litigation.9 In
it, he describes the "embryonic framework" for litigating these
cases, which includes a variety of tribunals. Professor Sands
discusses recent activity of the European Court of Justice and
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at length. The ICJ, or
"World Court" as it is popularly known, is "the principal judi-
cial arm of the United Nations [and] a dispute settlement body
available under many environmental treaties, including the
Climate Change and Biodiversity Conventions."92 Its pivotal
role in international environmental litigation stems from the
fact that treaties may give the ICJ compulsory jurisdiction over
an environmental dispute, or more typically, provide for juris-
diction upon consent of the parties.93
89. Alvarez, supra note 81, at 303.
90. See, e.g., Brown Weiss, supra note 36, at 710 (noting that "[i]n many interna-
tional legal instruments, states have agreed to constrain 'operational sovereignty'
while continuing to retain formal national sovereignty"); Sands, supra note 14, at xvii-
xviii.
91. See generally Sands, supra note 31. Professor Sands has written extensively
elsewhere about international environmental litigation, including cases decided before
the ICJ and other international tribunals (particularly those in Europe). See, e.g.,
Sands, supra note 71, at 57-59 (discussing the role of judicial settlement of interna-
tional environmental disputes).
92. Sands, supra note 71, at 57.
93. See id. at 57-58.
19991 1455
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1435
Professor Sands has distinguished himself both as an aca-
demic and an actively practicing barrister. His observations
stem directly from his experience, most notably as a co-counsel
in several of the most recent ICJ cases to take up enviromnen-
tal matters. Recently, he served as a counsel for Hungary in
the important case concerning the Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros pro-
ject, a dispute about the construction of dams on the Danube
River between Hungary and Slovakia. 4 His detailed critique of
the ICJ's handling of environmental disputes therefore merits
careful attention, both for its assessment of the future of inter-
national environmental litigation and for its implications for
national sovereignty. 5
4. Public Participation in International Environmental
Lawmaking and Enforcement Is More Significant
The explosive rise of NGO participation in international envi-
ronmental decision making has been called a "fundamental
shift" in international law, perhaps equal in scope to the earlier
rapid expansion of public participation in the United States."
As one commentator states, "the rhetoric of inclusion [at the
international level] is not mere rhetoric": international players
are emulating steps taken decades ago to guarantee public
94. Judgment in Case Concerning the Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v.
Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 3 (Sept. 25); reprinted in 37 LL.M. 162 (1998); see also Hungary
and Slovakia Told To Resolve Dam Tiff, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1997, at A12; Justice
For All From A Global Courtroom, LAWYER, Mar. 19, 1996, at 9 (describing the World
Court's recent activities and Professor Sands' involvement in the Gabcfkovo-
Nagymaros case).
For earlier discussions of this complicated case, see generally Gabriel Epstein,
Application of International Water Law to Transboundary Groundwater Resources, and
the Slovak-Hungarian Dispute Over Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, 19 SuFFOLK TRANSNA'L L.
REV. 67 (1995); Aaron Schwabach, Diverting the Danube: The Gabctkovo-Nagymaros
Dispute and International Freshwater Law, 14 BERK. J. INT'L L. 290 (1996); Paul R.
Williams, International Environmental Dispute Resolution: The Dispute Between
Slovakia and Hungary Concerning Construction of the Gabctkovo and Nagymaros
Dams, 19 COLuM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1994).
95. In Part II, I will invite the reader to consider the implications for a related
issue: domestic environmental lawmaking in a time of active debate over environmen-
tal federalism.
96. See Raustiala, supra note 14, at 539 ("As in the twentieth century American
experience, the expansion of the substantive domain of environmental regulation has
been accompanied by an expanded procedural and participatory regime.").
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input in the American system.7 It was therefore appropriate
for the Allen Chair Symposium and seminar series to assess
the status of this "participatory revolution.""
An excellent example of the rise of public participation in
international environmental law is the system of public input
established under the environmental side agreement to NAFTA,
the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC),99 which "goes further than most multilateral treaties
in terms of NGO access and participation." 0  Professor
Bugeda is an authority on this Citizen's Submission process,
having played a central role (as chief of the Mexican Liaison
Office of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation's
(CEC)) in developing the factual record' for the Cozumel
Submission-the lone submission to date to proceed to this
stage of the process. Her analysis of the Cozumel Factual Re-
cord is an instructive case study. Professor Bugeda concludes
that the Citizen's Submission process, despite its inherent
shortcomings, is an "interesting and innovative procedure" that
empowers ordinary citizens to take part in international envi-
ronmental decision making.02 As she demonstrates, it can al-
97. Id. at 581-82.
98. See id. at 583.
99. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993,
U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC].
100. Raustiala, supra note 14, at 549.
101. See Final Factual Record of the Cruise Ship Pier Project in Cozumel,
Quintana Roo, Secretariat of the CEC, Factual Record No. 1 (1997) [hereinafter
Cozumel Factual Record].
102. Bugeda, supra note 29, at 1614. There is a rapidly expanding body of litera-
tare on this subject. See, e.g., Greg Block, Independent Review of the North American
Agreement For Environmental Cooperation, SB79 ALI-ABA 291 (1998) (analyzing the
NAAEC's performance and, inter alia, the initial stages of the Cozumel dispute); Jo-
seph F. DiMento and Pamela M. Doughman, Soft Teeth in the Back of the Mouth:
The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement Implemented, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.
REV. 651 (1998); Noemi Gal-Or, Multilateral Trade and Supranational Environmental
Protection: The Grace Period of the CEC, or a Well-Defined Role?, 9 GEO. INT'L
ENvTL. L. REV. 53 (1996); David Lopez, Dispute Resolution under NAFTA: Lessons
from the Early Experiences, 32 TEX. INTL L.J. 163 (1997); James E.R. Lord, Article
14(2) of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation: How High Is
The Hurdle?, 2 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RES. J. 43 (1997) (discussing the Cozumel Citizen
Submission and the requirement that submitters exhaust local remedies); David G.
Schiller, Great Expectations: The North American Commission on Environmental Coop-
eration Review of the Cozumel Pier Submission, 28 U. MA1I INTER-AM. L. REV. 437
(1997) (discussing initial stages of the Cozumel Pier Terminal dispute); Scott A.
Keefer, Comment, Citizen Petitions Under the North American Agreement on Environ-
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so spur increased domestic public participation directly by em-
powering ordinary citizens to accuse countries of failing to en-
force their environmental laws, and indirectly by generating
information to "publicly denounce those governments when such
enforcement does not occur."
1 °3
II. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
INFORMS DOMESTIC LAW
From this brief description of the work of Professors Boer,
Brown Weiss, Bugeda, and Sands, the reader should be prompt-
ed to read their articles on the maturing regime of internation-
al environmental law. These articles confirm the need to move
past stale debates about whether international environmental
law is law at all to second-generation inquiries about its future.
However, the Allen Chair Symposium and seminar series af-
forded an opportunity to do more than demonstrate that envi-
ronmental law is beyond doubt a global enterprise.0 4 Profes-
sor Boer challenged the audience at his public lecture to view
domestic and international environmental law as increasingly
interrelated. In this Part, I accept that challenge and delve
more deeply into the relationship between international and
domestic environmental law. At first, one might think the dif-
ferences between the two legal regimes are so great that one
could not possibly inform the other. That view, however, would
be mistaken; for a number of reasons, it is no longer an "idle
question" to evaluate international environmental law's impact
on domestic law.0 5
mental Cooperation, 5 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 211 (1997).
103. Bugeda, supra note 29, at 1614.
104. The rapid expansion and development of this body of law and its growing
domestic impact make environmental law an excellent example of the internationaliza-
tion of law practice and the concomitant need for globalization of the law school cur-
riculum. See Nicholas A. Robinson, International Environmental Law, SC56 ALI-ABA
185 (Feb. 11, 1998) (noting an "emerging practice paradigm" that, "[olver the next 35
years, the global and transnational aspects of practicing law, and especially environ-
mental law, will (1) alter how U.S. lawyers practice environmental law in their
'domestic' practices, and (2) come to embrace an international law content").
105. See Tarlock, supra note 13, at 760.
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A. "Sustainable Development" Is a Conceptual Foundation for
Domestic Innovation
Probably the most obvious way in which international
environmental law influences domestic law is that it has estab-
lished first principles that serve as conceptual foundations for
domestic innovation. Professor Boer observes that three sepa-
rate phenomena are taking place as international environmen-
tal law matures: "globalization, internationalization, and
regionalization." 5 As part of internationalization, "countries
are looking externally to environmental conventions and
agreements to guide their own policies and laws."' In the
United States, this is a remarkable turn of events. I began this
article by proposing that many domestic environmental lawyers
have something of a nation-centered perspective. We still tend
to think our task is to translate American ideals to the rest of
the world.' 8 Today, international environmental law turns
that logic on its head. It can and does serve as a direct stimu-
lus for the enactment of domestic laws. The United States is
often obliged by an international environmental agreement to
promulgate laws to implement the agreement or come into
compliance with its norms.0 9 Besides binding obligations, in-
106. Boer, supra note 26, at 1508.
107. Id. at 1509.
108. Of course, we have been remarkably successful at this. See, e.g., Tarlock,
supra note 13, at 759 ("United States environmental law has served as the interna-
tional standard for the emerging regime of international environmental law."). Profes-
sor Sands describes American influence as follows:
[T]he United States has, historically, played a dominant role in the de-
velopment of international environmental law. Many of the principles
endorsed by the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development were
first expressed in U.S. domestic legislation, especially the emerging rules
of international law concerning environmental impact assessment, the
right of citizens to have access to environmental information and rights
of redress before judicial and administrative bodies, and provisions on
liability for environmental damage. Many of these emerging international
commitments can be traced directly to domestic U.S. law, which has in
this and other ways contributed significantly to international law reform.
Philippe Sands, The "Greening" Of International Law: Emerging Principles And Rules,
I IND. J. GLoBAL LEGAL STuD. 293, 293 (1994).
109. See infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text; see also Tarlock, supra note
13, at 761-62 (citing the example of the Endangered Species Act, "initially enacted to
implement the Convention on Trade in Endangered Species").
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ternational environmental law has yielded important principles
that can be touchstones for domestic innovation." °
Perhaps the most notable example of such a principle is the
one I focus on in this section: the emergence of "sustainable
development"-a principle first articulated on the world
stage--as a new framework for integrating economic develop-
ment and environmental concerns in domestic legal systems.
1. The Development of "Sustainable Development"
Sustainable development has become widely accepted as a
framework for advancing developmental and environmental
goals both at the domestic and international level."' Sustain-
able development means much more than maintaining a stock
of resources over time."' Sustainable development principles
can revolutionize environmental law"' by addressing issues of
110. See Tarlock, supra note 13, at 762 (noting that international environmental
law can provide the "conceptual foundation" for domestic law); see also Nicholas A.
Robinson, Attaining Systems for Sustainability Through Environmental Law, 12 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 86, 87 (1997) ("Multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs),
such as the Montreal Protocol and other agreements under the Vienna Convention on
the Protection of the Stratospheric Ozone Layer or the Convention on Biological Di-
versity, provide common 'rules of the road' for national legislatures shaping their
environmental laws."). Professor Tarlock argues that the authority of the Foreign
Commerce Clause could be invoked to use these principles to justify stronger domestic
environmental laws. See Tarlock, supra note 13, at 761-62.
111. See Boer, supra note 26, at 1510-12; see also Tarlock, supra note 14, at 52.
112. See Tarlock, supra note 14, at 52 (noting that "the concept of sustainability
comes from earlier ecological studies of predator-prey relationships and was adopted
by economists to refer to the maintenance of capital stocks over a limited time hori-
zon."); see also PHILIP SHABECOFF, A NEW NAME FOR PEACE 198 (1996) (noting that
"sustainability of resources, after all, was the central intellectual premise underlying
conservationism" and describing efforts in the 1970s and 1980s to draw attention to
depletion of resources); Joel B. Eisen, Toward a Sustainable Urbanism: Lessons from
Federal Regulation of Urban Stormwater Runoff, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. AND CONTEMP.
L. 1, 3-4 (1995). Problems related to resource depletion, overconsumption of resources,
and pollution are obviously integral to discussions of sustainable development. See
generally Boer, supra note 41, at 316-17 (quoting JEREMY CAREW-REID ET AL.,
STRATEGIES FOR NATIONAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR THEIR
PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION 17 (1994)). For that reason, writers occasionally con-
tinue to refer to sustainability in the language of steady state maintenance of re-
sources. See, e.g., JAMES HOWARD KUNsTLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE 246
(1993) (contrasting "a sustainable economy" with an "exhaustive economy").
113. See Ruhl, supra note 11, at 992-95 (proposing sustainable development as a
policy principle for a "revolutionized environmental law").
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pollution and resource depletion while simultaneously incorpo-
rating economic concerns and equity arguments first raised by
developing nations."
Sustainable development's modern history dates to the 1980
publication of the World Conservation Strategy;"5 its "decisive
breakthrough""6 on the world stage was the publication of the
Brundtland Report (better known as Our Common Future)."
That report had a potent message: environmental issues, eco-
nomic concerns, and developmental inequities must be ad-
dressed together." '8 Our Common Future provides the most
commonly cited definition of sustainable development:".9
114. See SHABECOFF, supra note 112, at 198-99; Dernbach, supra note 11, at 16;
Eisen, supra note 112, at 3 (noting the potential for sustainable development to "ad-
dress equity concerns, such as achieving a just distribution of resources between de-
veloped and developing nations"); Tarlock, supra note 14, at 52-53 (noting that
sustainable development has been adopted as the standard of modem
international environmental law in an effort to bridge the North-South or
rich-poor environmental gap . . . [and that] the major challenge posed by
the theory of sustainable development has been to systematically and
permanently incorporate the full environmental consequences of resource
use into the modern economic concepts that help to structure the politics
of resource allocation).
115. INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES ET AL., WORLD CONSERVATION STRATEGY: LIVING RESOURCE CONSERVATION
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (1980); see also Boer, supra note 41, at 308 (noting
that the publication of the World Conservation Strategy spurred governments to es-
tablish national conservation strategies); Dernbach, supra note 11, at 15 n.71, (noting
that the 1987 OUR COMMON FUTURE report builds upon the WORLD CONSERVATION
STRATEGY).
116. See SHABECOFF, supra note 112, at 198.
117. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIROmiENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMON Fu-
TURE (1987) [hereinafter OUR COI ION FUTURE]; see also Boer, supra note 41, at 310;
Jonathan Lash, Toward a Sustainable Future, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 83, 83
(1997) (stating that '[sustainable development] is an idea made prominent by the
World Commission on Environment and Development"); SHABECOFF, supra note 112,
at 198-99 (describing the development of OUR COMION FUTURE).
118. See OUR COMI1ON FUTURE, supra note 116, at 5 (stating that "ecology and
economy are becoming ever more interwoven-locally, regionally, and globally-into a
seamless net of cause and effect"); see also Lash, supra note 117, at 83; Tarlock,
supra note 14, at 52 ("The Brundtland Commission succeeded in collapsing the dichot-
omy between environmental protection and development to induce the developing
world to accept the legitimacy of environmental protection.").
119. See BOER ET AL., supra note 77, at 13; see also Dernbach, supra note 11, at
17-18; Lash, supra note 117, at 84 (noting that the President's Commission on Sus-
tainable Development adopted the Our Common Future definition); Tarlock, supra
note 14, at 52 (terming the Our Common Future definition the "current working def-
inition of sustainable development").
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Sustainable development is development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs. It contains
within it two key concepts:
(1) The concept of "needs," in particular the essential needs
of the world's poor, to which overriding priority should be
given; and
(2) The idea of limitations imposed by the state of technolo-
gy and social organization on the environment's ability to
meet present and future needs.12
As Professor Boer has noted, "there has been a good deal of
debate over the definition of sustainable development and over
what principles might be identified as assisting in its achieve-
ment."'2' But "[n]otwithstanding the debate over what the
principles of sustainable development are," the international
community has acted to endorse the concept and flesh out its
specifics. 2 The Rio Conference "introduce[d] the mandate of
sustainable development as the basis for global, national, and
local action,"" with twenty-seven principles designed to ad-
vance sustainable development. The UNCED delegates
unanimously adopted a second document, Agenda 21, that, as
Professor Boer has noted, "provides policies, plans, programmes,
and guidelines for national governments to implement the Rio
Declaration principles."24
120. OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 117, at 87; see also BOER ET AL., supra
note 77, at 13.
121. BOER ET AL., supra note 77, at 13. Professor Boer has criticized the OUR
COMMON FUTURE definition "because it invites narrow interpretations such as 'sustain-
able economic development,' without explicitly requiring concern for or focus on the
continued viability of ecosystems." Boer, supra note 41, at 317 (emphasis in original).
122. BOER ET AL., supra note 77, at 13.
123. Boer, supra note 41, at 313; see also Dernbach, Sustainable Development,
supra note 11, at 18 (noting that at Rio "for the first time, the international commu-
nity endorsed sustainable development."); Tarlock, Latin American Rainforest Manage-
ment, supra note 14, at 52 (noting that "Rio indicated the formal success of the
Brundtland Commission, thus making sustainable development the organizing princi-
ple for all future international efforts") (emphasis in original).
124. Boer, supra note 41, at 314; Dernbach, supra note 11, at 18-19, 27 (noting
that Agenda 21's principles are the basis for an "ambitious intergenerational social,
economic, and environmental compact."); see also Tarlock, supra note 14, at 52 n.86.
Professor Boer notes that Agenda 21, "should be read together with the Rio
Declaration." Boer, supra note 41, at 314 n.60. See generally Dernbach, supra note 11
(discussing implementation of sustainable development principles in the United
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Agenda 21's comprehensiveness makes it the blueprint for
action on sustainable development at the national and interna-
tional level. 5 Its forty chapters provide an encyclopedic pat-
tern of goals and objectives for sustainable development,126
and specific actions that nations should take to achieve those
goals and objectives."' As "soft law," it is every country's re-
sponsibility to incorporate Agenda 21 into its domestic decision
making and to create national policies based on Agenda 21's
mandates.2 ' If the IUCN Draft International Covenant on En-
vironment and Development 9 is adopted as an international
treaty, it could elevate principles of sustainable development to
an international requirement.3 0 Sustainable development will
then have completed its transition from an aspirational princi-
States); see infra Part 1A.2 for a discussion of Agenda 21's implementation domesti-
cally and internationally.
125. See Dernbach, supra note 11, at 19.
126. See id.; John Dernbach, U.S. Adherence to Its Agenda 21 Commitments: A
Five-Year Review, [1997] 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,504 (containing a thor-
ough discussion of Agenda 21). See generally Robert F. Blomquist, Virtual Borders?
Some Legal-Geo-Philosophical Musings on Three Globally Significant Fragile Ecosys-
tems Under United Nations' Agenda 21, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 23, 24 (1997) (stating
that "Agenda 21 was intended by its drafters to be 'a comprehensive action plan on
sustainable development to guide the policies of governments for the remainder of
this century and into the next."); Lash, supra note 117, at 84.
127. Professor John Dernbach's recent article outlining the many steps the United
States would be required to take to use sustainable development as a framework for
decision making at all levels of government illustrates that sustainable development
has advanced well beyond the aspirational definition of the OUR COMMON FUTURE
report. See generally Dernbach, supra note 11.
128. To some extent we recognize a limited normative force of certain
norms even though we concede that those norms would not be enforce-
able by an international court or other international organ.... To say
that it [soft law] does not exist because it is not of the "enforceable"
variety that most legal norms exhibit might blind us to another dimen-
sion of the reality of international practice.
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 55 (Anthony D'Amato and Kirsten
Engel eds., 1996).
129. WORLD CONSERVATION UNION, DRAFT INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ENVIRON-
MENT AND DEVELOPMENT (1995) [hereinafter -UCN DRAFT COVENANT].
130. See BOER ET AL., supra note 77, at 15-17 (discussing the draft covenant); see
also Nicholas A. Robinson, IUCN's Proposed Covenant on Environment and Develop-
ment, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 133 (1995) (describing the origin of the draft cove-
nant). The covenant has no legal effect at present, but Professor Boer notes that it
may be submitted to the United Nations for adoption as a treaty. See BOER ET AL.,
supra note 77, at 16. Article 1 of the draft covenant states that its objective is "to
establish integrated obligations to achieve the environmental conservation and sus-
tainable development necessary for humans to enjoy a healthy and productive life
within nature." IUCN DRAFT COVENANT, supra note 129, art. 1.
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ple to a set of requirements imposed on every nation to guide
development and implementation of environmental laws.
2. Implementing Sustainable Development Principles in the
Asian Region and in the United States
If one were to take Agenda 21 seriously, it would require a
fundamental reordering of societal institutions; Professor Boer
cites provisions calling for development and implementation of
comprehensive "legal and regulatory framework[s] for environ-
mental management" and recognizes that "substantial barriers
of an economic, political, and sometimes cultural character" can
hamper progress toward this goal."' Not surprisingly, as Pro-
fessor Nicholas Robinson has observed, "in many nations [sus-
tainable development is] still undefined operatidnally.""' Sus-
tainable development cannot be implemented simply by allocat-
ing funding for a single government program or establishing a
blue ribbon panel. Professor Boer has noted that "[t]he achieve-
ment of sustainability is a complex task, involving a broad
range of governmental, community, and industry initiatives.
These initiatives must be implemented globally, regionally,
nationally, locally, and individually.""'
Professor Boer's article is a comprehensive compendium of
case studies examining how sustainable development principles
articulated on the international level have served as the impe-
tus for laws and regulations in individual nations and sub-re-
131. Boer, supra note 26, at 1507; see also Dernbach, supra note 126, at 10,506
(stating that one cannot just "take Agenda 21 off the shelf and implement it"). This
sort of fundamental change is exactly what Professor Dernbach recommends in his
most recent article on sustainable development. He argues that this type of change
"may represent the only realistic means of achieving sustainable development":
At day's end, the core responsibility of developed countries is to recreate
workable models of sustainable development within their own boundaries
that are not merely fimctional, but that are obviously more attractive
than the development approach that they are currently pursuing. Indeed
it can be argued that the most important way for developed countries to
exercise international leadership is through their domestic implementation
and use of such models.
Dernbach, supra note 11, at 45; cf. Robinson, supra note 110, at 87 (noting that
"[sustainable development] is a goal with many obstacles blocking its realization").
132. Robinson, supra note 110, at 87.
133. Boer, supra note 41, at 325.
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gions of the Asian region. Professor Boer observes that coun-
tries in the Asia-Pacific region have only begun to incorporate
strategies for sustainability into their environmental laws and
regulatory structures."" The extent to which individual coun-
tries in the Asian region have developed and implemented envi-
ronmental laws varies widely, as Professor Boer notes in his
case studies. India has comprehensive environmental laws but
implementation has been "weak." Nepal's environmental law, by
contrast, is barely two years old. Countries in the Mekong river
region "are at different stages of legislative sophistication con-
cerning the protection of the environment." 5 China (whose
formidable environmental problems Professor Boer discusses at
length) has adopted its own Agenda 21 and has formed a "Na-
tional Environment Protection Agency" but is only "slowly" ad-
dressing its "serious environmental challenges."'36
Professor Boer's extensive discussion of environmental laws
and regulatory frameworks in the Asian region provides a
wealth of insights about the obstacles standing in the path of
successful implementation of sustainable development principles
in specific situations. These obstacles include imprecise defi-
nition of programs "necessary to achieve a coherent approach"
to environmental protection;' insufficient financial resources
and technical expertise;".. inadequate administrative, political,
and legal structures to bring about change;".9 recalcitrant gov-
ernment bureaucrats unwilling to make tough choices; 40 and
134. See generally Boer, supra note 26.
135. Id. at 1522.
136. Id. at 1539.
137. Id. at 1523 (discussing the Mekong River Basin Agreement and finding that it
"lacks sufficient detail").
138. See id. at 1527, 1549 (discussing "financial impediments" to achieving the
goals of the ASEAN Strategic Plan of Action and noting that the South Asian coun-
tries "could clearly use a great deal of assistance" and that there is a "need for fur-
ther technical assistance and resources" in the South Pacific island nations).
Similarly, Professor Sands has observed that "increased technical, financial, and
other assistance to States, particularly to developing States, is necessary to encourage
domestic implementation." See Sands, supra note 14, at xlvii.
139. See Boer, supra note 26, at 1527, 1544 (discussing the ASEAN Strategic Plan
of Action and political obstacles to change in China generally); cf Robinson, supra
note 110, at 87.
140. See Boer, supra note 26, at 1533 (discussing environmental protection in Indo-
nesia); cf. Robinson, Attaining Systems For Sustainability, supra note 110, at 87 (not-
ing that environmental progress can be thwarted because "most nations have left in
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deficient political will on the part of nations to cooperate with
each other.14' He suggests greater regional cooperation to ad-
dress important environmental problems based on the possible
model of the South Pacific Regional Environment Pro-
gramme. That, he says, would "promote a more consistent
approach to environmental management and conservation of
natural resources in the region."
4 3
Environmental law in the United States is obviously more
well developed than that of the Asian region but still lags be-
hind in terms of achieving sustainable development. Commen-
tators have called for the United States to have a "more consis-
tent approach" to environmental law based on sustainable de-
velopment principles, noting that the "concerted effort to pro-
gressively integrate governmental decision making on environ-
mental, social, and economic issues"" that Agenda 21 re-
quires is lacking. Professor John Dernbach, who has studied
American efforts to implement Agenda 21, concludes it "has had
little discernible effect on U.S. law and policy."'45 The rather
modest implementation efforts include the establishment of a
President's Council on Sustainable Development (PCSD), whose
reports,'46 filled with platitudes and recommendations over-
flowing with motherhood-and-apple-pie appeal,'47 have been
largely ignored.'
place the agencies and jurisdictions that preside over the old policies" and "these
institutional players are . . . wedded to 'business as usual'").
141. See Boer, supra note 26, at 1527-28 (quoting Simon S.C. Tay, South East
Asian Forest Fires: Haze over ASEAN and International Environmental Law, 7 REV.
EuR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 202, 204 (1998)).
142. See id. at 1547-50.
143. Id. at 1550.
144. Dernbach, supra note 126, at 10,507.
145. Id. See generally Donald A. Brown, Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: The
Emergence of Global Environmental Problems and the Critical Need to Develop Sus-
tainable Development Programs at State and Local Levels in the United States, 5
DIcK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 175 (1996) (reaching similar conclusions).
146. PRESIDENVS COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, BUILDING ON CONSEN-
SUS (1997); PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, SUSTAINABLE AMERI-
CA: A NEW CONSENSUS FOR PROSPERITY, OPPORTUNITY AND A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT
FOR THE FUTURE (1996) [hereinafter SUSTAINABLE AMERICA].
147. One PCSD goal for sustainable development is to "[e]nsure that every person
enjoys the benefits of clean air, clean water, and a healthy environment at home, at
work, and at play." SUSTAINABLE AMERICA, supra note 146, at ch. 1. Who wouldn't be
opposed to that?
148. See Dernbach, supra note 126, at 10,508; J.B. Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Rel-
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The PCSD reports and other federal efforts hardly amount to
a comprehensive plan to implement Agenda 21's recommenda-
tions and proposals. In a revealing recent essay, Professor J.B.
Ruhl describes "seven degrees of relevance" in translating policy
ideas into law, from the first degree where "the idea becomes
widely expressed through a generally-accepted norm statement,"
to the seventh degree where the norm becomes fully embodied
in hard law.49 He finds that the PCSD's reports were an
"opening salvo" in the evolution of American sustainable devel-
opment policy. 50 He observes that "Sustainable America is a
long way from hard law to apply" but believes that the PCSD
"advances rather than stalls or reverses the evolution of [U.S.]
sustainable development policy."' 5' This puts sustainable de-
velopment at the fifth degree of relevance-it is not translated
into law, but is nevertheless part of the everyday parlance of
federal agencies." 2
Along the way to making a more fully formed sustainable
development law, good ideas could be frustrated by uncommit-
ted or recalcitrant bureaucrats, or by insufficient education of
the general public and a resulting lack of interest.'53 Yet as
Professor Ruhl explains, while neither the PCSD's reports, nor
the subsequent policy discussions of sustainable development by
federal governmental agencies have been translated into law,
"the message flowing out of official channels is loud and
clear-sustainable development is a fully endorsed norm state-
ment of environmental policy."" How the United States will
take the remaining steps to transform this policy into law re-
mains unclear. Given how little has been accomplished and how
much would be required, it is difficult if not impossible to pre-
evance: Why Should Real-World Environmental Attorneys Care Now About Sustainable
Development Policy?, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POLy F. 273, 288 (1998) (stating that
"there has been no broad initiative thus far to create law that explicitly builds upon
the PCSD's work").
149. Ruhl, supra note 148, at 277.
150. Id. at 285.
151. Id. at 286.
152. See id. at 284.
153. See Dernbach, supra note 126, at 10,507-19 (describing the obstacles to imple-
menting sustainable development in the United States); Ruhi, supra note 148, at 292-
93 (listing the "five systemic factors ... that impede sustainable development" in the
United States and citing Professor Dernbach's analysis).
154. Ruhl, supra note 148, at 287.
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dict the future course of sustainable development law in the
United States. Professor Boer, like his American counterparts
who believe in the concept as a framework for change, is toiling
at an early stage of legal innovation. In the United States and
the Asian region, overcoming formidable obstacles-somewhat
different ones in each case, to be sure-will be necessary to
complete the successful implementation of the "first principle"
of sustainable development created on the world stage.
B. Reinvigorating Democracy-Public Participation and the
Cozumel Submission
International environmental law can do more than generate
first principles. The ascendancy of public input in the interna-
tional environmental decision making system can reinvigorate
democracy domestically. Enhanced participation at the interna-
tional level can mean much more than the simple expansion of
public participation opportunities available to actors and the
concomitant expansion in procedural guarantees in international
fora.y First, in a limited but growing number of situations,
international environmental law provides a direct mechanism of
citizen input in project decisions even where domestic law pre-
cludes it. Professor Bugeda's analysis demonstrates that an
international environmental law mechanism-such as the devel-
opment of the "factual record" in the Cozumel case-can provide
a direct avenue for public input in a domestic project. In the
United States, concerned citizens could use the Citizen's Sub-
mission process to influence individual decisions, though, as I
discuss below, I believe it would be difficult to do so.
Second, the Cozumel experience demonstrates the importance
of using all relevant means to generate openness and transpar-
ency in the availability of information, especially where these
means are lacking under domestic law. Professor Bugeda re-
minds us that although the Citizen's Submission process is
limited because it can proceed no further than the development
of a factual record, it has provided a springboard for Mexican
155. See Raustiala, supra note 14, at 539-40 (noting that "international regulation
increasingly influences and shapes domestic policy, [and] the procedures of interna-
tional and national policymaking have converged," citing public participation as an
example).
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environmental groups to discuss the project's merits in public
fora (which they would previously have been unable to do).
Thus, the final lesson of Professor Bugeda's article is just as
significant: that we need both formal mechanisms for public
participation and the ability and resources to create meaningful
public input through other means when formal mechanisms are
insufficiently available or exercised.
I begin this section by placing the Cozumel Submission in
the context of the rise of public participation in international
environmental decision making.
1. Increased Public Participation in International Environ-
mental Decision Making
While international environmental law allows for some public
input, this was not always the case. Until very recently, NGOs
played a limited role in the development and enforcement of
international environmental law. NGO involvement in interna-
tional law in the period before 1972 has been characterized
with the label of "[u]nderachievement." 56 NGO involvement in
international environmental law was no different. With very
few exceptions, environmental treaties neither mentioned public
participation nor provided explicitly for any public involve-
ment.
15 7
Since then, NGO influence in international environmental
decision making has been on the rise.158 The Brundtland Re-
156. See Charnovitz, supra note 64, at 190. It bears noting, however, that NGOs
have not always been uninvolved in international law, as some have claimed.
Charnovitz describes a cyclical pattern in which NGO influence has risen or fallen
periodically throughout the past two centuries.
157. See Raustiala, supra note 14, at 545. Before the recent expansion in NGO
participation in environmental decision making in the 1980s and 1990s, the Conven-
tion on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) contained perhaps the
most significant mechanism for NGO participation. See Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, opened for signature March 3,
1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [herreinafter CITES]; Raustiala, supra note
14, at 569 (calling the "inclusive participatory rules" of CITES an "anomaly" in inter-
national environmental law of the time); id. at 549 (stating that "CITES stands out
as the first major multi-lateral treaty to incorporate NGOs in an active way, and is
clearly a landmark in this regard"); see also EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNA-
TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PoLIcy 983 (1998) (calling NGO participation "inte-
gral to the operation of CITES").
158. See Charnovitz, supra note 64; Raustiala, supra note 14; see also Brown
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port was the first international report to advocate expanded
public participation opportunities.'59 Building upon that foun-
dation, Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration call for broad public
participation in developing and enforcing laws, and for in-
creased public access to information necessary to facilitate this
involvement.6 ' The Rio Declaration states that "environmental
issues are best handled with participation of all concerned citi-
zens, at the relevant level."' 6 ' Agenda 21 advocates broad-
based public participation in environmental decision making as
a "fundamental prerequisite for the achievement of sustainable
development." 6'
Reflecting this enhanced emphasis on citizen participation,
the trend is toward increased participation in international
environmental decision making. NGOs have "assumed an in-
creasingly important role in the negotiation, ratification, imple-
mentation, and enforcement of international environmental
agreements."' NGOs have increasingly taken part in official
negotiations and have attempted to influence developments
through informal pressure and other techniques.' Professor
Bugeda notes that the unique feature of the NAAEC in terms
of public participation is that any citizen or environmental
group may become directly involved in enforcement by making
a submission to the Secretariat of the CEC, the body which
administers the NAAEC, asserting that a party to the agree-
ment is "failing to effectively enforce its environmental
Weiss, supra note 36, at 693-94 (describing the myriad of ways in which NGOs are
involved both formally and informally in developing international environmental law).
159. See OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 117; see also Raustiala, supra note 14,
at 565-66.
160. See, e.g., Boer, supra note 41, at 332 (noting that "both Agenda 21 and the
Rio Declaration recognise the vital importance of public participation to the achieve-
ment of environmental goals"); Dernbach, Sustainable Development, supra note 11, at
40.
161. Rio Declaration, supra note 51, at princ. 10; see also Boer, supra note 41, at
332; Raustiala, supra note 14, at 566.
162. Agenda 21, supra note 59, at para. 23.2; see also Dernbach, supra note 11, at
37 n.198.
163. Brown Weiss, supra note 36, at 693.
164. See id. at 693-94.
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laws."'65 This, of course, is exactly what took place in the
Cozumel pier terminal dispute.
2. The Cozumel Experience and Domestic Public Participation
a. The Cozumel Submission
The Citizen's Submission process, as noted above, empowers
ordinary citizens or environmental groups to make submissions
to the CEC asserting that a party to the NAAEC is "failing to
effectively enforce its environmental laws."'66 The process had
previously been used by a handful of submitters; the Cozumel
Submission was the first to reach the stage of a factual re-
cord.'67
By stark contrast to the normal American ideal, public partic-
ipation was lacking in the evaluation of the Cozumel port ter-
minal. Mexican environmentalists had little opportunity to have
their voices heard in any environmental impact analysis of the
terminal project under the "NEPA-like" provisions of Mexico's
General Law for Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental
Protection (LGEE).ce As Professor Bugeda explains, and as
reflected in the Cozumel Factual Record, this was especially
egregious because the proposed construction project was a major
undertaking:
165. Bugeda, supra note 29, at 1598 (footnote omitted); see NAAEC, supra note 99,
at art. 14; David Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA: Lessons from the Early
Experience, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 163 (1997) (detailing descriptions of the Citizen's Sub-
mission process); see generally Commission For Environmental Cooperation (visited
May 13, 1998) <http:www.cec.org> (describing the CEC's activities and the citizen
submissions lodged to date).
166. Bugeda, supra note 29, at 1598 (footnote omitted); see supra note 165 and
accompanying text.
167. See Bugeda, supra note 29, at 1594.
168. LEY GENERAL DEL EQUILIBRIO ECOL6GICO Y DE PROTECCION AL AMBIENTE
[L.G.E.E.] (1996) (Mex.), available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, Mxenv File (General
Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection). The LGEE provisions
under Article 28 are discussed in Cozumel Factual Record, supra note 100, at 4. See
also Bugeda, supra note 29, at 1606-07. See generally Heather N. Stevenson, Environ-
mental Impact Assessment Laws in the Nineties: Can the United States and Mexico
Learn From Each Other?, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1675 (1999) (discussing Mexican envi-
ronmental impact assessment law, comparing it to NEPA, and finding that NEPA
provides for more extensive public input).
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According to the Submitters, the "Cruise Ship Pier Project
in Cozumel, Quintana Roo" forms an "indivisible part" of a
larger-scale project, which the Submitters refer to as the
"Port Terminal Project," comprising, in addition to the Pier,
a passenger terminal building, a means of access from the
terminal to the cruise ship pier, a parking lot, and a public
access road leading to the Chan-Kanaab Highway.169
The citizen submitters argued that construction of the pier was
authorized without proper evaluation of the entire project, as
required under Article 28 of the LGEE." ° Information needed
to validate this claim was difficult, if not impossible, for Mexi-
can environmental groups to obtain from recalcitrant bureau-
crats. The Mexican authorities' stonewalling response to the
original submission confirms the lack of governmental attention
to citizen groups' concerns.' 7 '
The publication of the factual record was the endpoint of a
lengthy process prescribed by Articles 14 and 15 of the
NAAEC."' The process commenced with the submission, con-
tinued through the CEC Secretariat's "acceptance" of the sub-
mission and two CEC Council votes (the first to prepare a fac-
tual record and the second to make the resulting document
public), and ended with the factual record's publication. 7' The
fifty-five page factual record was the product of a considerable
investment of CEC resources, including several years' effort on
Professor Bugeda's part. It presents a comprehensive look at
the Cozumel project; its sections include an exhaustive detailed
summary of the facts developed in the CEC's investigation 17 4
169. Cozumel Factual Record, supra note 101, at 3.
170. See L.G.E.E., tit. I., ch. V, art. 28. This argument sounds familiar because it
is directly analogous to those made in cases in the United States where environmen-
talists argue that projects are improperly segmented to avoid preparation of environ-
mental impact statements under NEPA. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW § 9.8(3), at 952-57 (2d ed. 1994).
171. See Cozumel Factual Record, supra note 101, at 7; Bugeda, supra note 29, at
1606-10.
172. See NAAEC, supra note 99.
173. See Bugeda, supra note 29, at 1616; see also Lopez, supra note 165, at 185
(footnotes omitted); Submissions on Enforcement Matters-Articles 14 & 15 of the
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) (visited Nov. 10,
1998) <http'J/www.cec.orglenglish/citizen/index.cfm?format=1> (description of the Citi-
zen's Submission process available on the CEC's Web site).
174. See Cozumel Factual Record, supra note 101, at 13-40.
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and a seventeen-year chronological history of development in
the Cozumel Pier area.175 As such, the factual record spot-
lights a wealth of information not previously publicly available.
Serving as the culmination of a lengthy and thorough investiga-
tion, the factual record is also a substantial professional
achievement for Professor Bugeda and her collaborators.
b. Lessons for Domestic Public Participation
Using Professor Bugeda's analysis as a reminder of the im-
portance of broad-based domestic participation might seem
unnecessary. We generally consider public involvement in our
environmental decision making one of the "untouchables of
modern democracy."'76 Extensive public participation in do-
mestic environmental law is deeply rooted,'77 so much so that
we often assume its omnipresence.7 8 Public activism led to
the enactment of modern federal environmental laws. 79 Stake-
holder participation is common in the creation of new laws, 8 °
development of environmental regulations by administrative
agencies,' 8' and even in the design of reinvention initia-
175. See id. at 45-52.
176. Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for De-
liberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 176 (1997).
177. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the Beginning, a Fundamental Shift of Para-
digms: A Theory and Short History of Environmental Law, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 981,
982 (1994); Joseph L. Sax, Environmental Law: More Than Just a Passing Fad, 19 U.
MICH. J.L. REFomI 797, 801-02 (1986); see also Rossi, supra note 176, at 175 (noting
that public participation enjoys a "sacrosanct status" in our society). For an interest-
ing contemporary perspective, see Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Is the Environmental Move-
ment a Critical Internet Technology?, 8 VILL. ENvTL. L.J. 321, 323 (1997) (stating that
the "Environmental Movement pioneered mass political movements to protect the
environment" and analyzing the potential use of the Internet to further environmental
goals).
178. See Mark J. Spaulding, Transparency of Environmental Regulation and Public
Participation in the Resolution of International Environmental Disputes, 35 SANTA
CLARA L. Rav. 1127, 1135 (1995) (stating that "we take for granted our broad access
to the courts and our ability to use the courts in order to address environmental
issues").
179. See SHABECOFF, supra note 112, at 62 (describing the history of public in-
volvement in fashioning environmental laws).
180. See Spaulding, supra note 178, at 1136-37.
181. See Raustiala, supra note 14, at 576 ('The APA and subsequent statute-spe-
cific procedures rest squarely on the notion that 'people should have a chance to say
what kind of law they want before it is made.'" (quoting MARTIN SHAPIRo, WHO
GuARDS THE GuARDIANs? 45 (1988))). Providing opportunities for public comment on
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tives.11 2 There is a long tradition of citizen involvement in en-
forcing environmental laws in the courts.' In recent years,
informal stakeholder dialogues have attempted to extend public
participation beyond that provided by formal means."M In
short, public participation, defined as broadly as possible, is a
touchstone of modern environmental law with widely recognized
benefits. 5'
pending regulations and permits is, of course, "accepted practice for regulators at all
levels of government." FINAL REPORT OF THE ENTERPRISE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 49 (1997) [hereinafter E4E RE-
PORT].
Where the ordinary notice and comment procedure of citizen input in regulation
may be ineffective, the process of negotiated rulemaking (or "reg-neg") may promote
direct stakeholder involvement in regulatory development. See Siobhan Mee, Negotiat-
ed Rulemaking and Combined Sewer Overflows (CSOs): Consensus Saves Ossification?,
25 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 213 (1997) (stating that "[t]he process is a means of
achieving improved regulation through cooperation between government agencies, the
regulated community, and public interest groups"). See generally Cary Coglianese,
Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46
DUKE L.J. 1255, 1271, 1330-36 (1997) (describing negotiated rulemaking and providing
an assessment of its promise of improving the rulemaking process).
182. See Steinzor, supra note 1, at 112 (noting that initiatives such as the Com-
mon Sense Initiative and Project XL "involve some form of public participation"); cf.
id. at 141-43 (commenting, however, that these public participation processes are
often inadequate).
183. See generally Zygmunt J.B. Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter: An Envi-
ronmental Law Paradigm and Its Consequences, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 805 (1986)
passim (discussing the author's involvement in the famous "snail darter" lawsuit un-
der the Endangered Species Act).
Since the enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, which added
the citizen suit provision of Clean Air Act § 304 (Clean Air Act § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. §
7604 (1994)), similar provisions have become common in federal environmental stat-
utes. See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 571 (1992)
(listing numerous citizen suit provisions of federal environmental statutes); Barry
Boyer and Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assess-
ment of Citizens Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833,
835-68 (1985); David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular
Federal System: Can Three Not be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority is Shared by
the United States, the States and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1617-27
(1995). But see Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizens Suits,
"Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 222 (1992) (noting that "the citizen
suit is probably best understood as a band-aid superimposed on a system that can
meet with only mixed success").
184. See E4E REPORT, supra note 181, at 49.
185. These benefits include:
[E]ngaging stakeholders (1) supports democratic decision-making, (2) en-
sures that public values are considered, (3) develops the understanding
needed to make better decisions, (4) improves the knowledge base for
decision-making, (5) can reduce the overall time and expense involved in
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This ideal, however, is not always met, as I have demonstrat-
ed elsewhere with respect to brownfields redevelopment pro-
jects. 8 ' In cases where domestic law provides inadequate
means of public input, international environmental law can
provide new means of public participation, even though one
would still be hard pressed to argue that a mechanism like the
Citizen's Submission process gives NGOs and ordinary citizens
as much influence as ordinary citizens have in the United
States. 87
For example, local activists in the United States could consid-
er a submission as an alternative to domestic public partici-
pation processes. Critics of the remediation process at a
Superfund site could argue that the United States was failing
to enforce its environmental laws effectively, and request the
development of a factual record. The basis of such a submission
presumably would be that the EPA should require a more strin-
gent standard of cleanup. 8' The factual record, as in the
Cozumel case, would serve as a basis for the investigation and
development of facts to support this contention. Leaving aside
for the moment the considerable procedural obstacles involved
in proceeding to this stage,'89 the factual record's limitations
decision-making, (6) may improve the credibility of agencies responsible
for managing risks, and (7) should generate better-accepted, more readily
implemented risk-management decisions.
Id. (quoting PRESIDENTIALCONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK
MANAGEMENT, FRAAEWORK FOR ENVIRONmENTAL RISK MANAGEMENT, FINAL REPORT 52
(1997)).
186. See generally Joel B. Eisen, "Brownfields of Dreams"?: Challenges and Limits
of Voluntary Cleanup Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 883.
187. For example, there is little recognition of the ability of an individual citizen
to sue to enforce international environmental agreements. See, e.g., Schiller, supra
note 102, at 448. But see Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 277 (1995) (indi-
vidual plaintiff successful in case before the European Court of Human Rights on
environmental claim premised upon violations of an international human rights con-
vention).
188. The submitters would argue that the cleanup did not meet the requirements
of the strict cleanup standard of CERCLA § 121. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (1994).
189. The submission could be doomed from the outset. The CEC Secretariat has
sole discretion to reject a submission, and the NAAEC outlines several factors to
guide the Secretariat's decision. In the seminar course, Professor Bugeda highlighted
one important factor that might cause a rejection: the Secretariat may reject a sub-
mission if it deems the submission to be designed to harass industry rather than
promote enforcement of environmental law. See NAAEC, supra note 99, art. 14(1)(a)-
(f), at 1488-89; see also Bugeda, supra note 29, at 1599.
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pose a problem. Professor Bugeda joins other commentators who
have criticized the process of NAAEC Articles 14 and 15 be-
cause it terminates in the preparation of a document which is
only informational and has no legal force. 9 ° To proceed fur-
ther under the NAAEC and require a party to enforce its envi-
ronmental laws, the dispute resolution process must be invoked.
Unfortunately, that process is available only to parties to the
agreement, not to ordinary citizens.' 9 '
Professor Bugeda's article, however, does more than allow us
to observe that the Citizen's Submission process could be ex-
tended to domestic projects, however useful that might be. She
points out that the information revealed during the preparation
of the factual record enabled NGOs and Mexican lawyers to use
the media to attempt to hold governments and developers ac-
countable for their actions. Elevating the discussion of the
Cozumel project to the international level provoked heightened
attention to the project and created added pressure on the Mex-
ican government to comply with applicable domestic environ-
mental laws.'92 The result, however, was hardly a desirable
outcome for Mexican environmentalists. Media attention cata-
lyzed a "spirited debate" about the Cozumel project,"9' but in
the end, Professor Bugeda concludes that, "the procedure had
little impact on the environmental community, and none what-
soever on the tourist project in Cozumel." '94
Despite this outcome, the Cozumel experience shows the
Citizen's Submission process to be "a crucial advance for the
involvement of . .. NGOs[ ] in the North American environ-
mental dialogue. ""' The public pressure brought to bear on
the Cozumel project through this process demonstrates the
190. See Bugeda, supra note 29, at 1603-04; see also Gal-Or, supra note 102, at 75
(noting that "the absence of direct guarantee of remedy is perceived by some as a
serious shortcoming of the submission process"); Mary Sutter, Pull Pier Permits,
"Green" Groups Urge Mexico Ministries, J. CoMM., Nov. 6, 1997, at 3B (noting that
"environmentalists complain that, with no enforcement recommendations, the [factual
record] does little to help the environment in NAFTA countries").
191. See NAAEC, supra note 99, art. 20; see also Bugeda, supra note 29, at 1594;
Gal-Or, supra note 102, at 75.
192. See Bugeda, supra note 29, at 1615; see also Gal-Or, supra note 102, at 91.
193. See Bugeda, supra note 29, at 1615; cf. Gal-Or, supra note 102, at 77-78.
194. Bugeda, supra note 29, at 1616.
195. Id. at 1603 (footnote omitted).
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value of openness and transparency of information. 9 ' The im-
portance of making information available is highlighted adroitly
by the fact that Mexican environmental groups could not have
generated public pressure on the government and developer to
comply with environmental laws without information previously
withheld from them. In this case, even a relatively weak inter-
national process limited to preparation of an unenforceable
informational document created opportunities for ventilating
important issues. In the United States, of course, environmen-
talists frequently resort to public fora to monitor compliance
with environmental laws. If a community group has the benefit
of information as comprehensive as that of the Cozumel Factual
Record, it will be better able to do this in any particular case.
Reminding us of the importance of this is another important
accomplishment of Professor Bugeda's article.
C. New Ways of Thinking About Old Problems (The Example of
Compliance)
Professor Brown Weiss's article spotlights another way in
which international environmental law affects domestic law: it
can shed insight into how a domestic regulatory system should
be structured to effectuate compliance with its provisions. One
commentator notes that the potential impact of Professor Brown
Weiss's work on compliance extends beyond international envi-
ronmental agreements,'97 providing a theoretical basis for a
discussion of compliance in international law generally. 9 s I
believe this groundbreaking study may have even wider applica-
bility. In this section, I propose that it can inform important
issues related to compliance in the domestic setting, using the
example of brownfields laws and policies to make my point.
Because international environmental law is so new, the ac-
tors in the system are constantly trying out new approaches to
196. This is also demonstrated by Professor Brown Weiss's discussion of the utility
of reporting requirements in international environmental agreements. See infra Part
II.C.I.c.
197. See Alvarez, supra note 81, at 303.
198. See id. at 307.
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ensure compliance with the evolving legal regime.' Professor
Brown Weiss has described some of these as follows:
Features which are intended to encourage compliance ...
include the establishment of an implementation committee
and non-compliance procedures, which have been unusually
effective for the Montreal Protocol, engagement of an en-
forcement officer (as in CITES), publication of violations (as
in CITES and Basel), providing a formal role for NGOs (as
in UNESCO's World Heritage Convention and in CITES)
developing a formal way with industry (as in the Montreal
Protocol and Ozone Action) and establishing scientific and
technical assessment and advice bodies to ensure that the
convention keeps pace with scientific advances.'
The breathtaking variety of this experimentation suggests that
any means of ensuring compliance domestically will probably
have some international parallel. Finally, the iterative nature of
compliance mechanisms in international environmental law,
with contemporary agreements building upon the successes and
failures of the past, will offer lessons for approaches to imple-
ment when first choices do not work.
So when we ask whether domestic actors are in "compliance"
with a law or policy, whether the law is "effective" in meeting
societal goals, or whether states and the federal government
should rely on negative incentives such as sanctions or less
formal norms of ensuring compliance, I suggest that Professor
Brown Weiss's debunking of myths about compliance can offer
some valuable insights.
1. Demythologizing Compliance
Before proceeding to a discussion of implications for the do-
mestic setting, I summarize some of Professor Brown Weiss's
significant observations. I caution the reader that others could
also be viewed as important to the domestic setting; for exam-
ple, her comments about Myth Nine (concerning the role of
NGOs) have considerable implications for our view of the role of
public interest environmental groups in the domestic law sys-
199. See Brown Weiss, supra note 36, at 708.
200. Brown Weiss, Strengthening National Compliance, supra note 80, at 302.
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tem. In this section, I group a number of Professor Brown
Weiss's responses to conventional wisdom about compliance into
three categories for the purpose of drawing parallels to the
domestic setting. These categories include:
- Delimiting the Analysis (Myths One and Two): Professor
Brown Weiss argues that compliance should not be assumed.
She also claims that analyzing the extent to which it occurs
requires conceptual separation of three different inquiries.
- Deciding Which Strategies Best Secure Compliance (Myths
Three, Five, Ten, Eleven, and Thirteen): Professor Brown Weiss
discusses which strategy of ensuring compliance with agree-
ments works best in individual circumstances, focusing on the
obligations incorporated in agreements and the measures avail-
able to ensure compliance with them; she also argues that a
"one size fits all" approach to compliance is inappropriate.
- Evaluating Specific Compliance Strategies (Myth Six): Pro-
fessor Brown Weiss assesses the utility of reporting require-
ments in international environmental agreements; this, of
course, is related to the inquiry above but important in its own
right.
a. Evaluating Compliance Through Separate Inquiries About
"Implementation," "Compliance," and "Effectiveness" (Myths One
and Two)
Professor Brown Weiss immediately refutes the classical
notion that countries always comply with international agree-
ments. She argues that the reality of compliance is a very dif-
ferent matter; "compliance," she has noted previously, "is a
complex process."2"' It cannot be judged as a choice of ex-
tremes: while "no country complies fully with all its internation-
al legal obligations," it is not the case either that states fail to
comply at all.2"2 Of particular note is that the success of com-
pliance depends on a country's "capacity to comply," meaning
(among other things) the relative technical and legal expertise
of actors in the system.2"' Scholars often assume that nations
201. Id. at 297.
202. Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1560.
203. Id.; see id. at n.17.
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have equal and constant capacities to comply with agree-
ments. °4  This assumption, according to Professor Brown
Weiss, is erroneous. Moreover, the degree of compliance not
only differs among nations, but varies over time because it de-
pends on factors subject to change; for example, "there is a
general trend toward increased compliance by states the longer
the agreement is in effect."" 5
Having demonstrated the complexities of deciding whether
nations comply with agreements, Professor Brown Weiss next
offers an analytical framework for evaluating compliance. She
argues that "implementation," "compliance," and "effectiveness"
are not the same, but rather different concepts that must be
addressed separately."6 She touches briefly on implementa-
tion--"the actions taken to give effect to the domestic obliga-
tions of the agreement"-and then shows that compliance is
broader than both "implementation" and "enforcement" because
it requires an evaluation of three separate but related is-
sues:20 7 compliance with procedural duties such as submitting
annual reports; compliance with substantive obligations of
agreements (e.g., the Montreal Protocol's requirement of phas-
ing out CFCs by the year 2000); and "compliance with the spir-
it of the agreement."2 ' Finally, Professor Brown Weiss cau-
tions that effectiveness and compliance should be evaluated
separately. Using the example of the Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), she argues that
deciding whether an agreement is "effective" in meeting its
stated or unstated goals "is not necessarily correlated with
compliance." 2°9 Decoupling the two concepts implies that an
agreement might be judged as effective without full compliance
204. See, e.g., Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Implementation, Enforcement, and Compliance
with International Environmental Agreements-Practical Suggestions in Light of the
World Bank's Experience, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 37, 39 (1996).
205. Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1561; see also Brown Weiss, Strengthening
National compliance, supra note 80, at 297.
206. See Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1562-63.
207. Id. at 1562; see id. at 1562-63; cf Sands, supra note 71, at 53 (noting that
"state compliance requires action in three ways: it must adopt national enabling legis-
lation, policies and programmes; it must ensure compliance within its jurisdiction and
control; and it must fulfil any obligations to the appropriate international institutions,
such as reporting the national measures taken to give effect to the obligations").
208. Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1563 (footnote omitted).
209. Id. at 1564.
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by actors in the system, which is on its face a remarkable but
appropriate conclusion.
b. Assessing the Efficacy of Strategies to Achieve Compliance
(Myths Three, Five, Ten, Eleven, and Thirteen)
Beginning with Myth Three, and continuing throughout the
rest of her article, Professor Brown Weiss tackles a subject that
has occupied both domestic and international lawyers for de-
cades. The core question is almost deceptively simple: which
strategies are best for ensuring that nations comply with agree-
ments? To address this question, Professor Brown Weiss consid-
ers, in turn, traditional assumptions relating to important
subparts of this inquiry: whether agreements should feature
binding or non-binding obligations (Myth Three); whether these
obligations should be defined precisely or more generally (Myth
Five); whether formal dispute resolution processes are impor-
tant (Myth Ten); whether coercive measures such as sanctions
are essential to deal with situations of noncompliance (Myth
Eleven); and finally, whether compliance strategies should apply
uniformly (Myth Thirteen).
Her insights with respect to Myths Three, Five, and Eleven
challenge several assumptions about international environmen-
tal agreements: that they must feature concretely defined, bind-
ing obligations, backed by the threat of negative incentives such
as "sanctions (military or economic), penalties, and measures
such as withdrawing membership privileges under the agree-
ment"210 to secure compliance. She concludes that non-binding
obligations-even if described generally in an agreement-have
numerous benefits. They "create expectations that may shape
behavior and avoid disputes," often lead to binding obligations
later, "provide flexibility to adapt to changing conditions," and
"send important signals about how countries are expected to
behave."" She finds that, "under some circumstances
nonbinding instruments may be complied with as well as bind-
ing ones.""2 Regarding the utility of formal dispute resolution,
Professor Brown Weiss concludes that while "[m]any interna-
210. Id. at 1584.
211. Id. at 1567, 1568, 1569 (footnote omitted).
212. Id. at 1570.
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tional environmental agreements provide for formal dispute
settlement procedures," in practice "the parties have never
invoked the formal dispute settlement procedures contained in
most ... agreements" and resolve their disputes in less formal
fora such as meetings of the parties to an agreement.21
As for coercive measures, Professor Brown Weiss observes
that "the historical record indicates that states have not relied
upon coercive measures to secure compliance with international
environmental agreements."214 However, she notes that the
option of sanction-based enforcement may be necessary if par-
ties are likely to disobey an agreement; they are "particularly
useful for countries whose intention to comply is weak or who
face strong domestic pressures to lapse into noncompliance."215
In her view, there are three distinct types of strategies to en-
sure compliance: coercive measures, technical and financial
incentives, and "sunshine" strategies."' "Sunshine" mecha-
nisms could include the following techniques, many of which
will be familiar to domestic environmental lawyers: "reporting,
on-site monitoring, NGO participation, public access to infor-
mation, transparency in decision making, public information
measures such as newsletters, local community involvement,
industry monitoring, and persuasion by parties and secretari-
ats."
217
The importance of sunshine strategies cannot be overlooked;
Professor Brown Weiss states that, "[i]nternational environmen-
213. Id. at 1581, 1582 (footnote omitted); see also Fitzmaurice, supra note 14, at
399 (stating that there is a trend in international environmental law "to lead away
from traditional, adversarial systems of dispute settlement, towards, for instance, non-
compliance procedures . . . or, in the case of the Court, towards a more widespread
use of advisory competence"). Cf. Sands, supra note 31, at 1639-40 (stating that
if states want international adjudicatory mechanisms, they do not seem
to want those that apply a contentious and conflictual procedure to envi-
ronmental matters. So, for example, in the field of ozone depletion, and
soon also in other areas such as climate change and sulphur pollution,
states are putting in place noncontentious procedures that are character-
ized by having more of an administrative function.)
214. Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1586.
215. Id.; cf Danish, supra note 85, at 802 (citing to arguments made by George
Downs and his co-authors about the utility of coercive measures).
216. See Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1588.
217. Id. (footnote omitted); see also Brown Weiss, Strengthening National Compli-
ance, supra note 80, at 299.
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tal agreements rely primarily on sunshine methods and incen-
tives."21s Another commentator calls for a "social enforcement"
approach to compliance: a middle ground that incorporates fea-
tures of a sanction-based approach and sunshine measures.219
The sunshine strategy, as this commentator and others have
observed, depends largely on a nation's "reputation" in the
international community ° Coercion is therefore inappropriate
for a variety of reasons. It is a blunt instrument that is "as
likely to undermine a treaty regime as to preserve it."22'
Moreover, measures such as sanctions are not a realistic option
for most nations because often only powerful nations can resort
to them.2
For all of these reasons, no compliance strategy will work
alone. This leads Professor Brown Weiss to her conclusion
about Myth Thirteen: compliance cannot be structured the same
way for each nation. A "mix of compliance strategies needs to
be available for each agreement," and the mix needs to be
218. Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1588; see also Brown Weiss, Strengthening
National Compliance, supra note 80, at 299 (sunshine methods are "the key way of
insuring compliance" in international environmental law); Danish, supra note 85, at
795-96; Farber, supra note 16, at 1314 (discussing ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HAN-
DLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
AGREEMENTS (1995), Professor Farber contends that "formal enforcement is of limited
efficacy, whereas various informal types of pressure to conform with international
norms may have more influence"); Shihata, supra note 204, at 41-42 (terming consen-
sual measures the optimal means for achieving sustainable development).
Critics of Professor Brown Weiss's position point to the observed high rates of
compliance with agreements that feature binding obligations. These statistics, howev-
er, can be misleading. See David G. Victor, The Use and Effectiveness of Non-Binding
Instruments in the Management of Complex International Environmental Problems, in
Compliance with International Environmental Treaties: The Empirical Evidence, supra
note 81, at 241 (noting that "compliance with legally binding agreements has been
high, but that often the influence of binding commitments on behavior is low").
219. See Danish, supra note 85, at 804.
220. See Brown Weiss, Strengthening National Compliance, supra note 80, at 299;
Farber, supra note 16, at 1315 (quoting the Chayeses); cf. Lakshman Guruswamy,
Book Review, 91 AM. J. INTL L. 207, 209 (1997) (reviewing RONALD B. MTCHELL, IN-
TENTIONAL OIL POLLUTION AT SEA (1994) (claiming that "international law does in-
voke compliance because it governs a law-abiding community of States, not a gang of
bandits or bank robbers"). Professor Koh notes that this view evokes themes about
domestic law that Professor Chayes develops in his classic book about domestic legal
process. See Koh, supra note 84, at 2638.
221. Danish, supra note 85, at 797; see also Brown Weiss, Strengthening National
Compliance, supra note 80, at 302.
222. See Danish, supra note 85, at 797.
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structured differently for each nation: "[tihe particular mix of
compliance strategies needed to induce compliance with a spe-
cific agreement will vary according to the profile of a state's
intent and capacity to comply with the agreement."2" More-
over, constant attention needs to be paid to the variables of
intent and capacity. Even if the country was able to comply at
first, it may be unable to do so later: bureaucratic structures,
technical and financial resources, and other assets necessary for
compliance can evolve over time, and not always for the bet-
ter.224 Professor Brown Weiss has concluded in her previous
work that only careful research can tell us what methods are
best for ensuring compliance with any given agreement."5 The
bottom line is considerably different from a lawyerly reliance on
coercion: innovative thinking, not a simple reliance on negative
incentives, is required to effectuate compliance, and actors'
intent and capacity to comply must be considered in developing
compliance strategies.
c. Assessing the Utility of Reporting Requirements (Myth Six)
Professor Brown Weiss makes several interesting points
about a specific type of "sunshine" measure that has "become
customary . . . in nearly all new international environmental
agreements:" 26 the requirement to file regular reports with
treaty secretariats. The reporting requirement has many salu-
tary features. The process of requiring the accumulation of
information for and the drafting of reports can educate parties
about the agreement, help "build local capacity to comply with
the substantive obligations in the treaty," and serve as an im-
portant tool for monitoring compliance.27 But these require-
223. Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1588.
224. See id.
225. See Brown Weiss, Strengthening National Compliance, supra note 80, at 298.
226. Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1574.
227. Id.; see also Brown Weiss, Strengthening National Compliance, supra note 80,
at 299.
In certain instances, NGOs have a more direct role in generating and using the
information from the parties about their obligations under particular agreements.
Professor Brown Weiss notes that the World Conservation Monitoring Unit tracks the
reports made under CITES and provides extensive information about the status of
each endangered species. See BROWN WEISS, supra note 157, at 983; see also Cathar-
ine L. Krieps, Sustainable Use of Endangered Species Under CITES: Is it a Sustain-
able Alternative?, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 461 (1996).
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ments are not without their disadvantages. Because incomplete-
ness and inaccuracies in reports is likely to be endemic," s
there must be a review process capable of highlighting viola-
tions." 9 As Professor Brown Weiss observed in the seminar
course, this is often lacking in the international setting: inter-
national bodies are often reluctant to call nations on the carpet
to account for violations of reporting requirements (particularly
inaccuracies in reports).
In the seminar course and in her article, Professor Brown
Weiss discusses two reasons why inadequate reporting takes
place, the first of which is the phenomenon of "reporting con-
gestion."' ° Numerous international environmental agreements
contain reporting requirements. Nations are signatories to mul-
tiple agreements, so national, state, and local officials will be
devoting precious time responding to these requirements. In a
nation with limited technical and scientific expertise, this in-
creases the potential for inaccuracy or incompleteness."' The
second problem involves the logistical difficulties inherent in as-
sembling the information required for reports. In the seminar
class, Professor Brown Weiss discussed the annual report re-
quired under CITES, which requires the aggregation of such
data as identification of species on export-import permits gener-
ated by nations around the world in a non-standardized fash-
ion. Given these logistical difficulties, it is not surprising that
228. The Brown Weiss-Jacobson study found a range of rates of compliance with
reporting requirements. See Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1575. Other empirical
studies have reached similar conclusions. A study by the United States General Ac-
counting Office and a study conducted for the United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development on the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agree-
ments have both found that "the proportion of states rigorously complying with re-
porting requirements was disappointingly low." See Shihata, supra note 204, at 43.
229. See Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1574; see also Victor, supra note 218, at
248.
230. Brown Weiss, Strengthening National Compliance, supra note 80, at 299. See
also Brown Weiss, supra note 36, at 700; Bethany Luldtsch Hicks, Treaty Congestion
in International Environmental Law: The Need for Greater International Coordination,
32 U. RIcH. L. REv. 1643 (1999) (identifying congestion in reporting requirements as
an example of "procedural" treaty congestion).
231. See Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1574; see also Shihata, supra note 204, at
43 (noting that because the number of international environmental agreements is
growing rapidly in the past two decades, reporting requirements require capacity that
nations may not have to make the reports).
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many reports are "incomplete, inaccurate, or late," and ineffec-
tive for the purpose of monitoring compliance. 2
2. Toward a New Approach to Compliance in the Domestic Set-
ting
As in the international arena, the field is wide open for
scholars to evaluate compliance issues in the domestic setting.
The issues that Professor Brown Weiss discusses in the frame-
work of the baker's dozen myths about compliance have re-
ceived little notice from commentators writing about my area of
focus in this section: the set of state and federal policies intend-
ed to expedite the remediation and redevelopment of "brown-
fields" sites (abandoned or underutilized urban sites that sit
idle in part due to concerns over environmental contamina-
tion). 3 The primary initiators of brownfields laws have been
the states. 4 Since 1988, almost forty states have developed
voluntary cleanup programs (VCPs) through statutory and regu-
latory reforms intended to speed up the cleanup of brownfields
sites." The federal government has been active as well.
Many (including me) have spilled considerable ink assessing
the wisdom of federal and state brownfields policies," but
232. Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1574 (footnote omitted).
233. See Robert H. Abrams, Comment, Superfund and the Evolution of Brownfields,
21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REv. 265, 273 (1997) (discussing characteristics
of brownfields sites); see also William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Fed-
eralism, and Institutional Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 1, 4
n.1 (1997) (setting forth a similar definition of brownfields); Eisen, supra note 186;
Michael Allan Wolf, Dangerous Crossing: State Brownfields Zoning and Federal Enter-
prise Zoning, 8 FORDmAM ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming 1999) (manuscript on file with au-
thor) (discussing the relationship between brownfields policies and enterprise zone
laws and policies).
234. See Eisen, supra note 186, at 914-15 n.153; see also Buzbee, supra note 233,
at 27-46 (describing "first mover" dynamics to explain how states came to take the
lead in brownfields law and policy); Wolf, supra note 233 (manuscript at 12-14);
Abrams, supra note 233, at 284-87 (discussing the evolution of Michigan's brownfields
program).
235. Since I last counted the number of states with formal voluntary cleanup pro-
grams, see Eisen, supra note 186, at 1033-39, a number of states have either amend-
ed or established voluntary cleanup programs. See generally 2 BROWNFIELDS LAW AND
PRACTICE (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1998) (listing and describing the features of state
programs).
236. See Robert S. Berger et al., Recycling Industrial Sites in Erie County: Meeting
the Challenge of Brownfield Redevelopment, 3 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 69 (1995); Jane F.
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few have devoted much attention to mechanisms designed to
ensure the long-run protectiveness of brownfields cleanups. In
part, of course, this is because this area of environmental law
is new. Many state brownfields programs came into existence in
the mid- to late 1990s, and few have a track record of success-
ful cleanups spanning five or more yearsY 7 I suggest a trans-
formation similar to that occurring in international environmen-
tal law is imminent: less attention will be paid to justifying the
laws; more to evaluating their efficacy. When we do get around
to addressing those complicated questions, it would be wise to
turn to Professor Brown Weiss's article.
Professor Brown Weiss offers insights about "what drives
relevant actors, including private multi-national corporations,
non-governmental organizations, and governments, to 'give ef-
fect' to international law." "m There is a universal quality to
her conclusions about this broad theme that prompts us to
refrain from dismissing the study as limited to international
environmental law. Of course, there are considerable differences
between the domestic and international settings, particularly
the entrenched enforcement-driven nature of most of our envi-
Clokey, Wisconsin's Land Recycling Act: From Brownfield to Greenfield, 2 WIS. ENVTL.
L.J. 35 (1995); Steven F. Fairlie, The New Greenfields Legislation: A Practitioner's
Guide to Recycling Old Industrial Sites, 5 DICK- J. ENVTL. L. & PoLY 77 (1996);
James T. O'Reilly, Environmental Racism, Site Cleanup and Inner City Jobs:
Indiana's Urban In-fill Incentives, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 43 (1994); David B. Hawley,
Note, The Brownfields Property Reuse Act of 1997: North Carolina Creates an Addi-
tional Incentive to Reclaim Contaminated Properties, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1015 (1998); Pe-
ter K. Johnson, Note, Mr. Smith Goes to Washington: 1997 Superfund Amendments:
Will it Solve the Liability Problem and How Will This Affect Massachusetts?, 31 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 1269 (1997); Thomas G. Kessler, Comment, The Land Recycling and
Environmental Remediation Standards Act: Pennsylvania Tells CERCLA Enough Is
Enough, 8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 161 (1997); Tara Burns Koch, Comment, Betting on
Brownfields - Does Florida's Brownfields Redevelopment Act Transform Liability Into
Opportunity?, 28 STETSON L. REV. 171 (1998); Eric D. Madden, Comment, The Vol-
untary Cleanup and Property Redevelopment Act-The Limits of the Kansas
Brownfields Law, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 593 (1998); Daniel Michel, Comment, The
CERCLA Paradox and Ohio's Response to the Brownfield Problem: Senate Bill 227, 26
U. TOL. L. REV. 435 (1995); Alexander H. Tynberg, Comment, Oregon's New Cleanup
Law: Short-Term Thinking at the Expense of Long-Term Environmental and Economic
Prosperity, 12 J. ENVTL. L. & L1TIG. 471 (1997). See generally Joel B. Eisen,
Brownfields Policies for Sustainable Cities, 9 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POLY F. 187 (1999).
237. For a listing of sites remediated in one of the larger state programs within
the past three years, see PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
PENNSYLVANIA'S LAND RECYCLING PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT 1-3 (1998).
238. Alvarez, supra note 81, at 307-08.
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ronmental laws. The distinctions, however, are less significant
than one would think. The voluntary nature of most
brownfields programs leads the actors in the system to treat
litigation as an unwanted last resort. Variations in the cast of
characters are not as pronounced as they appear. The globaliza-
tion of law means that the international environmental law
system consists increasingly of an extensive framework of inter-
action among nation-states, their sub-units, and private and
public sector organizations,"9 with this constant interaction
increasingly resembling that which takes place domestically.
With the appropriate caveats, therefore, one can begin to ex-
tend Professor Brown Weiss's conclusions to the compliance
setting of domestic environmental law.
a. Defining the Compliance Inquiry
As in the international setting, one cannot assume reflexively
that participants in the brownfields remediation system comply
with the laws; as Professor Farber notes, "even within a well-
integrated system such as the United States, local compliance is
not an automatic reflex."" Indeed, Professor Brown Weiss re-
futes this assumption on the international level in part by
drawing an analogy to studies showing that "citizens and other
private actors do not necessarily comply fully with national,
state (province), or local laws." 4' Professor Brown Weiss's in-
sights also give us an idea of what "compliance" means in the
domestic setting. Separating implementation from compliance is
important because brownfields laws, like international environ-
mental agreements, are not always wholly self-executing; some
state statutes require implementing measures in the form of
regulations establishing cleanup standards.242 Beyond this,
these are complex compliance issues. Consider just two of the
many issues involved in a brownfields cleanup: (1) whether the
property owner took the appropriate steps to ensure compliance
with an applicable cleanup standard, and (2) whether the owner
239. See Brown Weiss, supra note 36, at 709. I discuss this "globalization" trend
further in Part II.D. infra.
240. Farber, supra note 16, at 1315.
241. Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1561-62.
242. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.04(b)(1) (Anderson 1997) (Repl. Vol.) (di-
recting the preparation of rules identifying appropriate cleanup standards).
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actually performed a cleanup to the appropriate level. It is not
hard to see that all three of Professor Brown Weiss's compli-
ance subissues-procedural, substantive, and "spirit of the
agreement" concerns-are triggered by these questions.
Unfortunately, in brownfields cleanups, these compliance
issues require more attention than they have been given at
present." There is another inquiry that one can derive from
Professor Brown Weiss's response to Myth One. Does an indi-
vidual state's program advance the goals of brownfields law and
policy? In Professor Brown Weiss's terminology that is more
properly characterized as a question of effectiveness. Even if all
participants in brownfields remediation complied substantially
with all state and federal legal requirements, that does not
necessarily mean the laws are effective. I leave further elabo-
ration on this intriguing notion for another day.
b. Deciding on Appropriate Compliance Strategies
Which compliance strategy or strategies will prove most use-
ful in the brownfields setting? The regulatory structure is pre-
mised on its voluntariness, so it is not immediately apparent
that sanctions are an appropriate instrument for ensuring com-
pliance. I offer a hypothetical situation for considering a situa-
tion of potential noncompliance.
Assume a subsequent purchaser of a brownfields site first
remediated for industrial use intends to build houses on that
site. I also assume, as is often true, that a state's regulations
require additional cleanup of a brownfields site in that case for
use for residential purposes,' and that the state could pro-
hibit the purchaser from using the property in the desired man-
ner without performing an additional cleanup." The state
243. Theoretical treatments of this issue have begun to appear. See generally Wolf,
supra note 232 (advocating a "PLUS" system to address long-term protectiveness at
brownfields sites). However, no empirical analysis comparable in scope to the Brown
Weiss-Jacobson study exists.
244. See, e.g., OmO ADMIN. CODE §§ 3745-300-08(B)(2)(c), (B)(2)(d) (1998) (defining
"residential," "commercial," and "industrial" land uses and setting separate generic soil
cleanup standards for each, with the residential standard being the strictest); see also
Wolf, supra note 233 (manuscript at 32-34).
245. For a list of states that have adopted this approach, see Eisen, supra note
186, at 960 n.331. States also rely on private law means such as covenants recorded
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could also presumably withdraw privileges (for example, barring
the purchaser from eligibility to receive state grants or subsi-
dies if it did not perform an adequate cleanup).
Following Professor Brown Weiss's lead, it is important to
observe that not all purchasers are alike, and not all compli-
ance strategies should be either. 6 A hybrid "social enforce-
ment" strategy might be better for some cases than simply
relying on sanctions alone. For example, requiring regular re-
ports from actors and evaluating compliance through review of
those reports could be effective in the brownfields setting. The
purchaser could be required to make a comprehensive report at
the moment when the property transfer was contemplated, 7
and submit periodic reports and agree to on-site inspections
after performing the cleanup.
Indeed, one might conclude that a mix of different strategies
is important precisely because no two developers of brownfields
sites are alike. Consider the variables of intent and capacity. In
my hypothetical, our subsequent purchaser may have the intent
to comply with the requirement to remediate the site to a resi-
dential cleanup standard. However, the purchaser may be un-
able to do so if, for example, there is lingering scientific uncer-
tainty over key issues, such as the appropriate level of cleanup
required or the likelihood that a specified remedy might fail to
protect human health and the environment over time.' Rely-
ing on a reporting requirement alone may be useful in this
case; the inherent shortcomings could be dealt with by provid-
ing technical or financial assistance to the purchaser. This
with initial purchasers' deeds, but, "as every first-year property law student schooled
in the intricacies of common-law servitudes could testify, the most common form of
use restriction found in private law-the real covenant-is an eminently unwieldy and
unreliable mechanism to bind subsequent purchasers of the brownfield parcel." Wolf,
supra note 233 (manuscript at 37).
246. See also Ruhl, supra note 11, at 940 (arguing for diversity in regulatory ap-
proaches, rather than the traditional American pattern of reliance on command-and-
control mechanisms, because we should think of environmental law as a "complex
adaptive system").
247. This is the premise underlying state property transfer statutes. See Eisen,
supra note 186, at 959-61.
248. See id. at 906-10. See generally John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable
Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 261 (1991); John S. Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk, Information, and Regu-
latory Structure in Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 277 (1992).
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would comport with an important lesson of Professor Brown
Weiss's article: the mix of compliance measures must be de-
signed to deal with the variety of actors in the process and the
problems inherent in securing compliance.
c. Revisiting the Reporting Requirement
In my hypothetical above, I imposed a reporting requirement
on some purchasers, and, as in the international setting, the
requirement would have many desirable features. Our historical
openness regarding information contained in the reports 9
would ensure transparency and allow environmental groups to
detect noncompliance.250 So too could the exercise of meeting a
reporting obligation educate the purchaser about compliance
with brownfields cleanup requirements. However, we need to
account for some of the same problems Professor Brown Weiss
identifies, particularly "report congestion." In my hypothetical,
the subsequent purchaser may cut corners on its brownfields
cleanup report if it also has to make reports required under
other state and federal environmental laws (not to mention tax,
securities, and other laws). That this means the reporting re-
249. The information would presumably be available to non-governmental organiza-
tions under a state analogue to the Freedom of Information Act. See, e.g., VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 2.1-340-346.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cure. Supp. 1998).
250. This is comparable to Professor Bugeda's suggestion that a Mexican environ-
mental group could use the information developed in the Cozumel Factual Record. See
supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
It would not be an entirely unknown feature in domestic environmental law, of
course, to require regular reports; consider, for example, the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-To-Know Acts (EPCRA) reporting requirement and the availability
of citizen suits to enforce it. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-50 (1994). The information accu-
mulated in the EPA's database of information reported under EPCRA, the "Toxic
Release Inventory," has served as the basis for a number of citizen suits. See Michael
J. Vahey, Comment, Hazardous Chemical Reporting Under EPCRA: The 7th Circuit
Eliminates the "Better Late Than Never" Excuse From Citizen Suits, 29 LOY. U. Cm.
L.J. 225 (1997). These suits are not guaranteed to succeed. Courts have recently split
on the question of whether EPCRA allows citizens to recover for historical violations
of EPCRA's reporting requirements. Compare Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't,
90 F.3d 1237 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998) (allowing claims for
wholly past violations), and Vahey, supra, with Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Unit-
ed Musical Instruments, U.S.A., Inc., 61 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 1995) (denying claims for
historical violations).
The Supreme Court recently vacated Steel Company, finding that petitioners
lacked standing to bring their action. Three Justices argued that EPCRA does not
authorize citizen suits for historical violations. See Steel Company, 118 S. Ct. 1003.
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quirement is no panacea for effectuating compliance in the
brownfields setting is yet another important lesson to be de-
rived from Professor Brown Weiss's analysis.
D. The Dynamic Nature of National Sovereignty and Lessons for
the Environmental Federalism Debate
As I noted earlier, the rapid evolution of international envi-
ronmental law may also offer insights about delineating the
appropriate balance of regulatory power among federal, state
and local governments. At first, it would seem that Professor
Sands' article is an unlikely place to turn for help, focusing as
it does on a theme comparable to Professor Brown Weiss's dis-
cussion of Myth Ten regarding the utility of formal dispute
resolution procedures: "[wlith more international environmental
obligations on the horizon, now is certainly the time to start
thinking about the arrangements we wish to have in place in
the next century to help resolve the disputes that will inevita-
bly arise."251
Professor Sands first describes the current status of interna-
tional environmental litigation. He finds that existing tribunals
such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the European
Court of Justice, and the Appellate Body of the World Trade
Organization have a decidedly mixed record in terms of inte-
grating environmental considerations into their decisions. Then,
he analyzes the recurring proposal to address perceived short-
comings of the current system by creating an international
environmental court, and concludes that "the time is clearly not
ripe to establish such a body."252 He believes the international
community should encourage litigation in existing fora, particu-
larly by "those players most directly affected by environmental
issues," believing "[t]he time will no doubt come when these
players will gain enhanced access to the more traditional bod-
ies."253 His article is a valuable resource for lawyers who want
to find ways to expand the traditional limited view of interna-
tional environmental litigation's purpose.
251. Sands, supra note 31, at 1640; see supra note 213 and accompanying text.
252. Sands, supra note 31, at 1640.
253. Id. at 1641.
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Another way to look at his article, however, is that it illus-
trates the dynamic nature of the relationship between nations
and the international community. In the second part of this
section, I argue that the debate over this relationship's future
has features comparable to the environmental federalism debate
raging in the United States, and that Professor Sands offers
lessons that can translate to that debate. Before making this
argument, I begin with a summary of Professor Sands's conclu-
sions about international environmental litigation.
1. The Future of International Environmental Litigation
Professor Sands finds that there is a "steady increase in
international environmental litigation" which will "continue"
given the rapid proliferation of international environmental
law.254 At the moment, however, there is a relatively meager
and incoherent body of case law in this field. He analyzes the
ICJ's recent cases, noting that the ICJ has little experience
with environmental disputes. As recently as 1994, he observed
that the ICJ "is yet to make a really significant contribution to
the development of international environmental law."255 Four
years later, he believes that the ICJ's treatment of three cases
(Nuclear Tests II, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, and
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros)256 has "indicated an ability to address
environmental issues, at least indirectly."5 '
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1625 (quoting Philippe Sands, The International Court of Justice and
the European Court of Justice, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 221 (Jacob
Werksman ed. 1996)). See also Fitzmaurice, supra note 14, at 398.
During the first four decades of the [ICJ's] existence, environmental is-
sues hardly featured at all in the matters that came before it, and this,
despite the growing importance of environmental protection in the de-
velopment of international law during the 1970s and 1980s. . . . The only
case which directly raised major environmental issues was the Nuclear
Tests I case in 1974; but the [ICJ] ignored these and rested its decision
on other grounds.
Id.
256. Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1995
I.C.J. 3 (July 6) (known as Nuclear Tests II); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nucle-
ar Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 809 &
1343 (1996); Judgment in Case Concerning the Gabckovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung.
v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 3 (Sept. 25), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 162 (1998).
257. Philippe Sands, Statement of Mr. Philippe Sands, in INCREASING THE EFFEC-
TIVENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
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In the first two of these cases, though, the ICJ "side-stepped"
important and basic issues." It was therefore "possibly .
radical" for the ICJ even to recognize in the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros case that emerging environmental norms and stan-
dards must be taken into account by nations, though the ICJ's
opinion hardly went as far as it could have to integrate
principles such as the precautionary principle into its deci-
sion. 9 In short,
the question arises as to whether the ICJ has missed an
opportunity to indicate a real willingness to show its envi-
ronmental credentials? This is not to say that environmen-
tal concerns should have trumped all others. Certainly, the
court demonstrated an understanding of the unique difficul-
ties presented by environmental issues, of the existence of
various standards to be applied, and of an indication as to
how these could be applied to the facts.26
Thus, recent ICJ decisions have brought attention to environ-
mental considerations, but "do not contribute to the much need-
ed development of the law by way of judicial insight."6 ' Other
tribunals have been more successful, particularly the European
Court of Justice, which, with its "established environmental
case load of over 150 cases," constitutes "the principal driving
force in developing European Community (EC) environmental
law."262 Still others, such as the European Court of Human
Rights,263 the International Centre for the Settlement of In-
ICJ/UNITAR COLLOQUIUM TO CELEBRATE THE 50TH AINIVERSrTY OF THE COURT 438,
439 (Connie Peck & R.S. Lee eds., 1997).
258. Sands, supra note 31, at 1629 (footnote omitted). Professor Lakshman
Guruswamy agrees with this judgment, observing that in the Nuclear Weapons Advi-
sory Opinion, the ICJ avoided the responsibility of enforcing an international environ-
mental agreement. See also Laksman Guruswamy, Commentary of Professor
Lakshman Guruswamy, in INCREASING THE EFFECTIvENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ICJ/UNITAR COLLOQUIUM TO CELEBRATE
THE 50TH ANNivERSiTY OF THE COURT 418, 426-27 (Connie Peck & R.S. Lee eds.,
1997).
259. Sands, supra note 31, at 1631; see id. at 1630.
260. Id. at 1633.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1626.
263. In the seminar course, Professor Sands discussed the case of Lopez Ostra v.
Spain in which the court allowed a plaintiff to bring an environmental cause of ac-
tion alleging breaches of Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention of Human
Rights, found in favor of the plaintiff for breach of Article 8, and awarded damages
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vestment Disputes, and the Appellate Body of the World Trade
Organization, have adjudicated cases involving environmental
issues." With international environmental law growing rapid-
ly, the meager record of decisions to date and the involvement
by multiple tribunals lead some to call for the establishment of
a single international environmental court:
[P]roponents of a dedicated international environmental
court or tribunal argue that existing bodies lack the requi-
site expertise, that the absence of a single body will lead to
a fragmentation in the application of environmental stan-
dards, and that the failure of the ICJ to play an adequate
role leaves a major gap.265
While the ICJ's creation of an "Environment Chamber" would
appear to respond to this view, Professor Sands sees it at best
as an "effort[ I to head off ... a new body."266
Professor Sands then discusses the wisdom of establishing
such a court. Taking up this complex question,"7 he acknowl-
edges the range of views regarding the proper function of inter-
national adjudication,268 particularly the "two basic approach-
and costs and expenses. See Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 277, 292-98
(1995).
264. See Sands, supra note 31, at 1634; see also Shihata, supra note 204, at 45
(discussing cases decided before the ICSID).
265. Sands, supra note 31, at 1636.
266. Id. at 1640. Ibrahim Shihata of the World Bank states that the Chamber
could "bring about a greater degree of compliance with environmental obligations."
Shihata, supra note 204, at 44. Professor Sands has found this claim unpersuasive,
having observed that "the Chamber is essentially a political creation .... It seems
to me extremely unlikely that a case would ever get to the Chamber, unless it was
on an extremely narrow point, on the interpretation of a treaty." Sands, supra note
257, at 439.
267. Delegates at a conference held in Rome approved a treaty establishing a sin-
gle permanent tribunal to deal with international offenses such as genocide and war
crimes, over the objection of the United States's delegates. See Elizabeth Neuffer, War
Crimes Tribunal Adopted As U.S. Votes 'No," BOSTON GLOBE, July 18, 1998, at Al.
The discussion of creating a single environmental tribunal is similar to that
about the potential for creating a single global environmental regulatory body. See
Esty, supra note 14, at 112; Sir Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International
Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 259, 282-83 (1992) (proposing the creation of
an "International Environmental Organization"); see also Brown Weiss, supra note 36,
at 699 (noting Sir Geoffrey Palmer's proposal for a "common institutional home for
international environmental agreements"). Like the idea of a single environmental
tribunal, the desire for a single supranational organization to handle environmental
issues "is not commonly shared." Shihata, supra note 204, at 42.
268. See generally Laurence R. Heifer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory
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es" of a "minimalist" view (a tribunal should decide the precise
questions presented to it) and an expansive view (a tribunal
should fill gaps in vague international environmental trea-
ties). " He then raises problems common in environmental
law both at the domestic and international level: the difficulty
of resolving competing scientific claims, the challenges of inter-
preting complex statutory and regulatory language, and so
forth. ° He also introduces issues unique to international en-
vironmental law, such as the different positions of developed
and developing countries about environmental issues.271
While Professor Sands believes that more international envi-
ronmental litigation is likely, he observes that it is too soon to
establish an international environmental court.272 He states
that nations simply do not want such a tribunal:
[S]tates are not clamoring to establish an international
environmental court .... [I]f states want international ad-judicatory mechanisms, they do not seem to want those that
apply a contentious and conflictual procedure to environ-
mental matters. So, for example, in the field of ozone deple-
tion, and soon also in other areas such as climate change
and sulphur pollution, states are putting in place noncon-
tentious procedures that are characterized by having more
of an administrative function .... a sort of international al-
ternative dispute resolution.27
At present, then, working with the existing system holds
more promise than creating a new court. Professor Sands ob-
serves that, "the possibility of an international environmental
court should be kept on our radar screens, but the time is
clearly not ripe to establish such a body. The very fear of its
creation may serve as an inducement for various courts to dem-
onstrate their ability to address environmental issues."74
of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997) (discussing interna-
tional adjudication generally, and evaluating the potential for translating European
models of transnational adjudication to other legal systems).
269. Sands, supra note 31, at 1637.
270. See id. at 1637-38.
271. See id. at 1639.
272. See id. at 1640.
273. Id. at 1639-40.
274. Id. at 1640.
1496
FROM STOCKHOLM TO KYOTO
2. The Future of National Sovereignty: Parallels to the
Environmental Federalism Debate
There is additional insight to be gleaned from Professor
Sands's comments that hint at the considerable flux in the rela-
tionship between individual nations and the international com-
munity.275 Professor Sands does not suggest, as others have,
that the international environmental law regime necessarily
"portend[s] the 'demise' or even the 'end' of 'sovereignty' (at
least as traditionally conceived)."276 Instead, one can read Pro-
fessor Sands's article as confirming the considerable flux in the
relationships of actors in this system. His comments about the
dynamic nature of international environmental litigation hint at
a larger tension between national sovereignty and the need to
address international environmental issues. The importance of
national sovereignty is well established in international envi-
ronmental law. It finds its most notable expression in Principle
21 of the Stockholm Declaration, which states:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law, the sover-
eign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their
own environmental and developmental policies, and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their juris-
diction or control do not cause damage to the environment
of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.27
This statement has been reaffirmed in Principle 2 of the Rio
Declaration, "with the addition of the words 'and developmental'
after the word 'environmental,' at the insistence of various
developing economies."278 Note that this declaration still leaves
275. See id. at 1639-40; cf. Alvarez, supra note 81, at 303 (noting that internation-
al environmental agreements make significant intrusions on domestic jurisdiction).
276. Alvarez, supra note 81, at 303; cf Lynton K. Caldwell, International Environ-
mental Politics: America's Response to Global Imperatives, in ENVIRONMIENTAL POLICY
IN THE 1990S TOWARD A NEW AGENDA 301, 301 (Norman J. Vig and Michael E. Kraft
eds., 1990) (stating that "[tihe concept of national sovereignty is of declining signifi-
cance in a world that increasingly faces environmental problems affecting people ev-
erywhere").
277. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 42, at princ. 21.
278. Ben Boer, Environmental Law and the Law of Nature, HUMAN RESOURCES
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much room for interpretation. What actions create "damage ...
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction?" How are these ac-
tions to be reconciled with the "sovereign right" of nations to
control their economic destinies? Which institution has responsi-
bility for making these judgments?
Nations' reluctance to establish a single environmental court,
of course, perhaps best exemplifies the lack of resolution of this
tension. Professor Sands has noted that states balk at surren-
dering sovereignty to international institutions: "Sovereign in-
terests, however, have resulted in a general unwillingness of
States to transfer much-if any-enforcement power to interna-
tional institutions. This unwillingness highlights the fundamen-
tal tension between the juridical reality of States' territorial
sovereignty over their natural resources and the physical reality
of ecological interdependence."279
That "fundamental tension" is evident in the ICJ's treatment
of recent cases. The ICJ's hesitation to adopt common environ-
mental principles evidences a considerable reluctance to submit
individual nations to the will of the international community.
Additionally, the ICJ's judgments are difficult to enforce. By
coincidence, during Professor Sands's residence in Richmond,
the ICJ heard Paraguay's request for "provisional measures""'
in the Breard case. Angel Breard, a Paraguayan national, had
been sentenced to death in Virginia for the rape and murder of
an Alexandria woman.2"' Paraguay claimed that Breard's
rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations were violated because Breard was not given an oppor-
tunity to consult with a Paraguayan consular official during his
trial. The ICJ "indicated" provisional measures, pending a deci-
sion on the merits of this claim."' Virginia refused to obey
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, May 1997, at 1-2.
279. Sands, supra note 71, at 55.
280. "Provisional measures" are a remedy roughly equivalent to a preliminary in-
junction in domestic law, and are authorized by Article 41 of the statute establishing
the International Court of Justice. They are "intended to preserve the respective
rights of the parties pending [a] decision, and [presuppose] that irreputable prejudice
shall not be caused to rights which are the subject of a dispute in judicial proceed-
ings . . . . " International Court of Justice, Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice (visited Nov. 2, 1998) <httpj/www.icj-cij.org/Basicdoc/Basetext/istatute.htm>.
281. See Philippe Sands, An Execution Heard Round The World, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
16, 1998, at B9.
282. See International Court of Justice, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
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the provisional measures, with Governor James Gilmore claim-
ing Virginia was not obliged to follow the ICJ order unless
ordered to do so by an American court,283 and executed
Breard. Professor Sands' comments on the Breard case (in the
seminar course and other law school fora) and the ICJ's envi-
ronmental cases raise an exceedingly complex-and to date
unresolved-question about national sovereignty: in what in-
stances should international judgments supplant individual
nations' decisions (and, in the Breard case, decisions of their
political sub-units)?2"
If one were to substitute American states for nations and the
federal government for international institutions, this discussion
about sovereignty could be seen to parallel the environmental
federalism debate now raging in the United StatesY5 Broadly
speaking, the states see themselves as innovators and seek to
avoid federal involvement in environmental protection; the EPA
seeks to ensure federal primacy and the achievement of mini-
mum environmental protection standards. On the surface, any
comparison to the international setting might seem unwarrant-
ed due to differences in legal and political dynamics. Domestic
(Para. v. U.S.), Request For The Indication of Provisional Measures, Order, April 9,
1998 (visited Nov. 2, 1998) <http//www.icj-cij.org/idocket/idocket/ipaus/ipausframe.
htm>; see also Sands, supra note 280. I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the
extensive work done by my colleague, Professor Leslie Kelleher, on this case at the
domestic level, and her involvement, together with Professor Sands and Professor
Daniel Murphy of the Law School, in a forum held during Professor Sands's visit. For
a more comprehensive discussion of this issue, see Philippe Sands, The Breard Case:
From Virginia to the Hague, 11 RicH. L. 10 (1998).
283. See Sands, supra note 281.
284. One need only contemplate the Supremacy Clause implications of a suggestion
that state and federal courts should defer to judgments of the ICJ to see the analyti-
cal quagmire ahead. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Sands, supra note 282, at
10. See generally Frank Green, Albright Asks: Stay Execution, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH,
Apr. 14, 1998, at Al; Frank Green, Court Will Hear Advice on Breard Execution
Scheduled For Tomorrow Night, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 13, 1998, at B1 (discuss-
ing the argument before the Supreme Court regarding Virginia's obligations to enforce
the ICJ order, including Supremacy Clause implications).
285. [A] central and raging debate in environmental law focuses on the
balance of power between state and federal governments and the merit of
the system of so-called "cooperative federalism7 that has been in place for
twenty-five years and under which the federal government has taken the
policy-shaping and standard-setting role for the states and their local
subdivisions.
Ruhl, supra note 11, at 981; see also Buzbee, supra note 233. Scholarly treatments of
this issue are listed in Ruhl, supra note 11, at 981 n.190.
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states and private actors face the possibility of federal retribu-
tion if they disobey their obligations (and, of course, it is pre-
cisely this fear that drives the states to call for increased au-
tonomy). At present, nations have no such worries about the
enforcement power of any international body." 6
Professor Sands, however, reminds us that nations are in-
creasingly entering into binding obligations, compliance with
which will have to be obtained in some fashion. He emphasizes
the need to "start thinking about the [institutional] arrange-
ments we wish to have in place in the next century" to handle
environmental issues.287 Observing that there is no one opti-
mal dispute resolution forum, he proposes instead the consider-
ation of litigation in a variety of fora. He concludes his article
with an energetic discussion of the potential roles of a wide
range of decision making bodies, including the ICJ, Permanent
Court of Arbitration, Hamburg Tribunal, and others. 8
It is this search for a multifaceted environmental law regime
that finds a parallel on the domestic level, where scholars high-
light the limitations of traditional suppositions about the feder-
al-state relationship. Professors William Buzbee and J.B. Ruhl,
for instance, challenge rigid assumptions about federal and
state interests in environmental protection-including general-
izations about state sovereignty and federal primacy-as mask-
ing the complexity of the issues and the need for diversity in
regulatory approaches.
Professor Buzbee, commenting specifically on brownfields law
and policy, observes an "institutional determinism" whereby
actors make simplistic and deterministic assumptions about
what governments and brownfields developers think and do.289
To Professor Buzbee, determining which level of government
should make decisions such as setting brownfields policies to
286. See Sands, supra note 31; cf. Christopher D. Stone, Defending The Global
Commons, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW 34, 36 (noting that "combatting strategic
behaviour and securing cooperation in the international arena is considerably more
difficult than overcoming the analogous obstacles in domestic contexts" because in the
latter, "dissenters-potential freeriders-can be simply forced to pay their share by
law").
287. Sands, supra note 31, at 1640.
288. See id. at 1640-41.
289. See generally Buzbee, supra note 233.
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ensure subsequent purchasers' compliance with their obligations
would have a complex answer; no one single institutional option
would suffice. Similarly, Professor Ruhl's "complex adaptive
systems" theory leads him to the comparable conclusion that
traditional cooperative federalism approaches are insufficient for
the environmental law of the next century. Instead, he calls for
"nested, coupled levels of [regulatory] organization,"29 featur-
ing both traditional forms of regulation and cooperative mecha-
nisms such as interstate compacts.
Other writers, particularly those who favor uniform federal
environmental controls over decentralization and devolution,29'
might not view calls for webbed institutional relationships so
favorably. Professor Sands would probably disagree with this
conclusion. Like Professors Ruhl and Buzbee, he implies that
centralizing regulatory authority (in this case, judicial authority
to decide environmental cases) is not necessarily preferable at
present to a system of institutional arrangements, however
imperfect they may turn out to be. There may be a consistency
problem, as maintaining coherence among decisions of different
international tribunals29 2 may be as difficult as ensuring that
fifty states' brownfields programs protect the environment. This
is a challenge to be identified and managed. Centralization in
and of itself is not the answer.
III. CONCLUSION
The rich and varied theoretical work of the four Allen Chair
Professors demonstrates that international environmental law is
increasingly blended with its domestic counterparts. Its most
obvious link to the domestic setting is as a source of domestic
law, both directly through the requirement that domestic law
conform to international agreements, and indirectly through the
generation of first principles such as sustainable development.
More than that, however, it reinforces cherished ideals such as
public participation and, as it grows and matures into a com-
290. Ruhl, supra note 11, at 982.
291. See generally Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Imple-
mentation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L.
REv. 1267 (1985) (arguing in favor of uniform centralized environmental controls).
292. See Sands, supra note 31, at 1641.
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plex regulatory regime, offers insights about our own environ-
mental law system.
Therefore, as law becomes more global, domesti6 actors
should pay careful attention to the growing impact of interna-
tional environmental law on domestic law. The Allen Chair
Professors demonstrate that there is a wide range of benefits to
be recouped domestically from lessons learned on the world
stage.
